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Regulating Environmental and Safety Hazards of 
Agricultural Biotechnology For A Sustainable World 
George Van Cleve∗ 
Agricultural biotechnology today has considerable support in the 
U.S. agricultural community as an important means to improve 
agriculture. In certain other parts of the world, the value and 
perceived dangers of agricultural biotechnology are a subject of 
intense debate. A key task for U.S. policymakers is to assure that the 
regulatory and liability system that controls the development of 
agricultural biotechnology strikes a proper balance between the 
progressive and successful development of new technology and the 
need to protect the public and the environment from harm. 
This Article seeks to illuminate the proper approach for regulating 
the environmental and safety hazards of agricultural biotechnology. 
This Article examines the structure and principles of such regulation 
in view of generally accepted principles of environmental regulation 
designed to create a sustainable world. The extent to which differing 
biotechnology regulatory approaches chosen by the United States and 
other parts of the world are consistent with sustainability principles 
should assist us in examining whether improvements in 
biotechnology regulation would be desirable.  
This Article first presents an overview of key legal principles that 
support sustainability. This Article then reviews the major alleged 
risks of agricultural biotechnology. It then describes the existing U.S. 
 
 ∗  Partner, Van Cleve & Eder, Washington, D.C.; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1977. Mr. 
Van Cleve wishes to offer warm thanks to Luis M. Acosta, of the District of Columbia bar, for 
his substantial research assistance with this Article. Mr. Van Cleve also wishes to offer special 
thanks to Kristen Byrnes Floom, of Van Cleve and Eder, for her substantial research assistance, 
and in particular, for her work in researching and writing the Starlink™ case study discussed 
below. The views presented here, however, are solely those of the author. This Article was 
prepared for the 2002 National Association Environmental Law Societies’ (NAELS) 
Conference: “Sustainable Agriculture: Food for the Future” held at Washington University 
School of Law in St. Louis on March 15-17, 2002. 
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and European agricultural biotechnology regulatory system designed 
to control those risks. Next, this Article analyzes the existing U.S. 
regulatory system using sustainability principles. In the course of that 
analysis, this Article considers lessons to be derived from three case 
studies: the permitting of Starlink™ corn, the discovery of Mexican 
maize containing genetically engineered corn genes, and the possible 
permitting of transgenic salmon for ocean fish farming. This Article 
also considers lessons from the broader regulatory history of pest-
protected plants. Based on the analysis of sustainability issues related 
to agricultural biotechnology, this Article concludes that despite the 
obvious, substantial benefits that agricultural biotechnology can 
confer on society, the United States needs to improve its regulatory 
process to ensure a proper weighing of the full social benefits and 
costs of agricultural biotechnology and to clarify liability rules 
governing the use of agricultural biotechnology. These reforms 
should provide both better public protection and increased public 
support for the agricultural biotechnology industry. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The progress of agricultural biotechnology is often measured in 
the popular imagination by news accounts of groundbreaking 
scientific developments such as the cloning of Dolly, the sheep, by 
Scottish scientists. Although less sensational, an indication of 
potentially greater consequence is a recent report by the National 
Research Council (NRC) discussing the growing number of 
transgenic pest-protected crops commercially planted in the United 
States.1 
 
 1. Comm. on Genetically Modified Pest-Protected Plants, Bd. on Agric. and Natural 
Ress., Nat’l Research Council Genetically Modified Pest-Protected Plants: Science and 
Regulation xi (2000) [hereinafter NRC Report]: 
Transgenic pest-protected crops were first commercially planted in the United States in 
1995. Since then the acreage planted to transgenic crops has increased rapidly with 
some 70 million acres being grown in the United States, and 98.6 globally in 1999. Of 
this acreage, a large percentage (for example, 30 million acres in the US in 1999) is 
planted with transgenic pest-protected crop varieties containing the Bacillus 
thuringiensis (Bt) gene which confers protection from certain insect pests and with 
varieties that are herbicide-tolerant. In 1998, about 25% of the US cotton acreage and 
21% of the corn acreage was planted with varieties containing Bt genes. 
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Remarkably, these millions of acres of crops were planted even 
though the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had not then 
adopted final regulations governing the approval process for 
transgenic pest-protected plants.2 Although the EPA’s proposed 
regulations have been on the books since 1994 and have generally 
been implemented in practice, the regulations were not finalized, 
even in part, until 2001.3 In fact, some aspects of the proposed 
regulations are still not finalized, including certain exemptions 
recently found to be scientifically questionable, or in some cases even 
indefensible, by the NRC.4 Moreover, probable violations of the 
inadequate EPA regulatory restrictions on the use of a genetically 
engineered corn strain, Starlink™ corn led to the “voluntary” 
removal of its EPA registration, the withdrawal of millions of acres 
of corn from the market, and the proposal of substantial changes in 
regulatory rules governing biotechnology plant crops in both the 
United States and Europe.5  
These regulatory failures suggest that the actual marketplace use 
of genetically modified plants in the United States appears to be 
substantially outpacing the ability of the U.S. regulatory system to 
effectively control their use. In itself, this lack of effective control 
does not indicate that there is an inherent problem with agricultural 
biotechnology, but it does indicate, very strongly, that this is a good 
time to take a dispassionate look at whether the performance of the 
U.S. regulatory and liability system can be improved.  
The remarkably rapid and widespread introduction of pest-
protected crops in the United States, where most of the world’s 
 
 2. See id. 
 3. The EPA’s final rule on plant-incorporated protectants (PIP), issued July 19, 2001, 
clarifies the relationship between plants and plant-incorporated protectants and establishes new 
regulations specifically for PIPs. See Regulations Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act for Plant-Incorporated Protectants, 66 Fed. Reg. 37772 (July 19, 2001).  
 4. The NRC Report, issued in 2000, criticized the EPA’s proposed exemptions that 
would categorically apply to all viral coat proteins and transgenic pest-protectants derived from 
sexually compatible plants. See NRC Report, supra note 1, at 13. The EPA’s final rule, issued 
in July 2001, fails to determine the propriety of these two exemptions. See Plant-Incorporated 
Protectants, 66 Fed. Reg. 37855 (proposed July 19, 2001). In fact, the EPA placed the entire 
NRC Report in the docket for rulemakings related to certain proposals on PIPs, and requested 
public comment on the document, particularly with regard to its conclusions about these 
exemptions. See id.  
 5. See infra Part VI.A. 
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existing acreage of such crops is planted, is in striking contrast to the 
situation in Europe, where many genetically modified U.S. products, 
such as BT corn, could not be sold for several years and now face 
sharply increased regulation.6 
This contrast arose because over the past twenty years the United 
States and most other countries adopted divergent approaches to the 
environmental and safety hazard regulation of agricultural 
biotechnology.7 The U.S. government accepts the view that 
agricultural biotechnology is merely a technical extension of 
traditional agricultural selective breeding practices, which it regards 
 
 6. According to Jeffrey Francer: 
[As of 2000], sales of corn from the United States to the European Union (EU) have 
been halted since 1997. EU nations barred the import of corn and its by-products—
trade that had once averaged more than 2.1 million tons annually and accounted for 
almost 5 percent of all U.S. exports. While farmers in the states had been exporting 
corn to Europe since the early days of our Republic, this facet of international trade is 
effectively at a standstill, because portions of the American corn have been grown 
from genetically modified seeds. The European embargo of American-grown corn 
threatens $500 million of annual U.S. corn exports, and at the time of this writing, the 
trade dispute has still not been resolved. 
Jeffrey K. Francer, Frankenstein Foods or Flavor Savers?: Regulating Agricultural 
Biotechnology in the United States and European Union, 7 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 257, 257-58 
(2000) (footnotes omitted). 
 7. As used in this Article, the term “agricultural biotechnology” means genetic 
modification of food or animals using recombinant DNA or cell fusion technology and includes 
items such as plant gene expression to produce toxins (sometimes referred to as “pest-protected 
plants”), cloning, and animal production of human drugs or vaccines. Animal cloning and drug 
production involve complex additional issues that fall outside the scope of this Article.  
 From another perspective, biotechnology could be described as: 
allow[ing] scientists to manipulate genetic material, whether it involves the cloning 
and propagation of plants that possess the desired characteristics, or the creation of 
new varieties from existing stock. Biotechnological procedures allow scientists to 
move specific genes within an organism, or from one organism to another, whether the 
gene is from an organism of the same species or a different species. Generally 
speaking, the product of these processes can be described as “bioengineered,” 
“genetically engineered,” or “transgenic.” In the broadest sense, an agricultural 
product that has been genetically altered using biotechnological techniques is 
frequently called a “Genetically Modified Organism” (GMO) or a “Living Modified 
Organism” (LMO).  
See Holly Saigo, Note, Agricultural Biotechnology and the Negotiation of the Biosafety 
Protocol, 12 GEO. INT’L. ENVTL. L. REV. 779, 783 (2000).  
 This Article does not consider the moral, ethical, equity, and property rights or related 
economic efficiency issues raised by biotechnology except to the extent they arise within the 
framework of sustainability. 
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as both time-tested and largely harmless or self-correcting, and 
regulates biotechnology products accordingly.8 The first major 
National Academy of Sciences’ review of biotechnology in 1987 
concluded that biotechnology products, rather than processes, should 
be the subject of risk analysis for regulation.9 The recent NRC Report 
on genetically modified pest-protected plants reaffirmed this 
conclusion.10  
The remainder of the world, however, considers that recombinant 
DNA and cell fusion biotechnology are capable of creating organisms 
and products that could not exist under conditions of natural 
selection. Although the European Union (EU), for example, 
acknowledges that there are benefits to agricultural biotechnology, it 
also has substantial concerns about the risks of that technology.11 As 
 
 8. See Francer, supra note 6, at 265-66. Francer explains that the U.S. government 
adopted a “Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology” in 1986, under which 
“foods, drugs, medical devices, biologics, and pesticides developed through modern 
biotechnology would be regulated within the same statutory framework as comparable products 
using traditional techniques.” Id. Furthermore, Francer notes that “[i]mplicit in the Coordinated 
Framework’s policy—that additional legislation would not be needed to regulate 
biotechnology—are the assumptions that products developed through biotechnology do not 
pose inherent risks to human health and that the level of risk from biotechnology depends on 
the characteristics and consumption of individual products.” Id. at 267.  
 9. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., INTRODUCTION OF RECOMBINANT DNA-ENGINEERED 
ORGANISMS INTO THE ENV’T: KEY ISSUES (1987) (as quoted in NRC Report, supra note 1, at 
5). 
 10. See NRC Report, supra note 1, at 43-45.  
 11. The EU’s view of agricultural biotechnology can be summarized as follows:  
Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) or ‘living modified organisms’ (LMOs) offer 
considerable potential for increasing agricultural productivity, but at the risk of 
unpredicted and unintended impacts on existing biological systems. For example, the 
transfer of genetic material from genetically modified agricultural crops to wild plants 
could reduce their genetic diversity, a potential problem where native ecosystems and 
agricultural land are adjacent. The traits of herbicide resistance and stress tolerance in 
GM crops have the potential to be transferred to weed species, increasing the 
competitive advantage of weeds over native varieties and reducing the susceptibility of 
the weeds to herbicides (CEAT 1994). There may also be direct effects, such as the 
toxicity of some GMO pollen to honeybees.  
GM crops, and possibly livestock, can supplant native varieties (land races) by 
commercial pressures such as patenting and seed monopolies. These practices can 
present a direct threat to agrobiodiversity. They may also present a threat to “Food 
security”, by reducing system complexity and thereby increasing the risk of 
widespread crop failure. Further challenges to sustainable development could arise as a 
consequence of control of the technology by a limited number of multinational 
corporations, and commercial pressures to develop monopoly mechanisms such as the 
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a result, the EU is prepared to allow countries to bar agricultural 
biotechnology products unless conclusive scientific evidence of their 
lack of harm is provided.12  
This broad difference in regulatory approaches to agricultural 
biotechnology is based, in part, on the differing cultures, economies, 
and political and natural environments of different parts of the 
world.13 It would be prudent to consider whether this apparently 
fundamental difference of view on biotechnology regulation is based 
solely on such sociopolitical factors, or may, instead, have some 
grounding in ecological principles. After all, the European approach 
to biotechnology regulation is similar, in important respects, to the 
way in which U.S. environmental laws regulate most environmental 
hazards, since individual American states are permitted by federal 
law to set health and safety standards for environmental risks in 
excess of federal minimum standards in many cases.14 One way of 
answering the question about the ecological grounding of these 
differing regulatory approaches is to examine biotechnology 
 
‘terminator gene’. The risk of adverse impacts from GMOs on biodiversity 
necessitates the development of international protocols for their transport, handling 
and use. Where technical, financial, institutional and human resources to address GMO 
biosafety are lacking, risks of negative impacts are higher. Use of GMOs requires the 
agreement of concerned states if there is any potential for adverse effects on 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. 
European Union, Toward Sustainable Economic Development and Co-operation 285 (2000), 
version 1.0, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/sector/environment/env_integ/ 
env_integration_manual/pdf/BiodiversityBPGuide.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2002).  
 12. The Cartagena Biosafety Protocol (Protocol) represents formal international 
recognition of this view. See CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY TO THE CONVENTION ON 
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (Feb. 23, 2000), available at http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/ 
protocol.asp# (last visited Jan. 13, 2001). The Protocol contains exemptions for pharmaceuticals 
and certain other biotechnology products. Id. at 5-6. 
 13. The EU exists, after all, primarily as an effort to overcome the heavily protectionist 
trade policies of its member countries in order to promote free trade throughout the EU. It 
would not have been necessary to create such a group if these countries had permitted free 
trade. It is generally acknowledged that agriculture is one of the most, if not the most, heavily 
subsidized and protected industries within many countries of the EU. As a result, complaints 
about the alleged dangers posed by U.S. biotechnology products can be a remarkably 
convenient pretext for European trade protectionism. However, it by no means follows that 
simply because a foreign country has a protectionist economic interest in criticizing a 
biotechnology product that there is no basis for the criticism of the product.  
 14. See, e.g., Clean Air Act of 1965 § 112(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1994); Clean Water 
Act of 1972 § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1994); Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 § 114, 42 U.S.C. § 9614 (1994). 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol9/iss1/7
p245 Van Cleve book pages.doc  12/18/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002]  Regulating Environmentalists 251 
 
regulation in light of the broad lessons about sustainability learned 
from several decades of successful U.S. environmental regulation.  
Fitting biotechnology regulation into the context of sustainable 
development is an important international goal, both from an 
environmental and economic perspective. The significance of this 
issue is described in the recent report of the EU-U.S. Consultative 
Forum on Biotechnology.15 
 
 15. EU-U.S. Biotechnology Consultative Forum, Final Rep. 7 (Dec. 2000) [hereinafter 
Consultative Forum]: 
One of the greatest challenges facing today’s world is achieving sustainable agriculture 
in developed and developing countries. Today the world is not food secure in terms of 
access to food. Eight hundred million people are undernourished and 200 million 
children under five years of age are underweight. The world’s population will increase 
by another 1.5 billion within the next 20 years. Improvements in yield on a reliable and 
sustainable basis will be needed to meet the demands of the growing population. The 
place of biotechnology and other technologies and approaches in today’s world should 
be seen in this context. 
 The Consultative Forum endorses public responsibility for global governance of 
biotechnology as one contribution to sustainable agriculture. All stakeholders should 
take their share of responsibility in being open with citizens and consumers, 
establishing transparent and accountable mechanisms for developing accurate 
information, sponsoring participatory debate, and striving for comprehensive and 
comprehensible regulatory systems.  
Conventional agriculture has significant limitations that support the effort to develop 
agricultural biotechnology:  
With respect to agriculture, agronomists can use genetics to manipulate characteristics 
that are commercially important to crop production and the agribusiness industry. 
Specifically, agronomists work towards four main objectives. For each crop, 
agronomists seek to improve: (1) agronomic suitability of the crop plant to its 
environment, (2) quality of the crop produced, (3) yield of the crop produced, and (4) 
the resistance of plants to disease and pests.  
Historically, the only way to improve qualities of crop plants has been to selectively 
breed the plants to enhance the desired characteristics. Cross-breeding different 
varieties of self or cross-pollinating plants results in the development of many unique 
and genetically diverse landrace varieties, also called cultivated varieties (“cultivars”), 
of crop plants that possess the qualities sought by the farmer. Although cross-breeding 
is an effective means of improving crop plants on a large scale, it can be incremental, 
time-consuming, and imprecise. There is no way to precisely control individual traits, 
such as resistance to a certain fungus, without concurrently altering a variety of other 
traits. Additionally, cross-pollinating plants do not discriminate as to what other plants 
with which they will reproduce. The plants will cross within their variety and across 
varieties, and can outcross with wild relatives. While such outcrossing can be seen as 
beneficial because it increases diversity of the genetic base, it can result in the 
expression of traits unexpected or contrary to the intention of the breeder.                     
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II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES SUPPORTING SUSTAINABILITY 
There is no formal global consensus on environmental principles 
or policies necessary to create a sustainable environment. In part, this 
results from the U.S.’s refusal to ratify significant international 
environmental agreements over the past two decades. These include 
the Convention on Biological Diversity,16 which was an outgrowth of 
the Rio de Janeiro Summit; its offshoot, the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety;17 and the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change.18 At the 
 
Consequently, agronomists have turned to biotechnology in seeking a better way to 
breed for the expression of specific desired traits.  
Saigo, supra note 7, at 782-83 (footnotes omitted). 
 16. According to Saigo, the U.S.’s refusal to ratify the Convention on Biological Diversity 
should have been expected:  
[T]he United States had repeatedly voiced three substantive objections to the 
provisions of the Convention. First, the Convention required developed countries to 
help fund environmentally sound development in developing countries, without 
imposing definite restrictions on the funding power that could be levied against the 
developed countries.  
Second, the Convention called for essentially open technology transfer—specifically 
including transfer of biotechnologies in Article 16, Paragraph 1—between developing 
and developed countries. This, when analyzed in conjunction with other related 
provisions, disregards patents and other intellectual property rights. Not only does this 
provision require transfer of publicly owned technology, but also transfer of 
technology that is privately owned, despite the proprietary intellectual property rights 
of the owner. . . .  
Third, the Convention calls for regulatory measures to be applied to biotechnology that 
are not required for other potentially environmentally harmful or diversity reducing 
activities. Article 8(g) of the Convention specifically requires nations “to regulate 
living modified organisms resulting from biotechnology which are likely to have 
adverse environmental impacts that could affect the conservation and sustainable use 
of biological diversity, taking also into account the risks to human health.” In addition 
to the language of Article 8(g), Article 19, paragraph 3 of the Convention states:  
The parties shall consider the need for and modalities of a protocol setting out 
appropriate procedures, including, in particular, advance informed agreement, 
in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of any living modified 
organism resulting from biotechnology that may have adverse effect on the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.  
Id. at 802-04 (footnotes omitted). 
 17. See Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: Signatures and Ratifications, available at 
http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/signinglist.asp (last visited Apr. 4, 2002). The full text of the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety can be found in the Cartagena Protocol to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 5, 
1992, 31 I.L.M. 818, available at http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/protocol.asp (last visited 
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same time, however, the United States, through its environmental 
policies, actually supports, and indeed developed, many of the core 
environmental principles embodied in these international 
agreements.19 Thus, although there is no formal consensus for 
coordinated, international action on certain issues, in many cases, the 
United States subscribes to commonly held environmental policy 
principles.  
Scientists agree that creation of long term environmental 
sustainability entails the creation of a balance, or equilibrium, 
between the supply of environmental goods and the demands on the 
environment.20 There are a series of basic principles that, while not 
rigorously observed in practice, are generally accepted as factors in 
regulatory policy decision making in the United States that are 
supportive of creating an environmental equilibrium that would lead 
to sustainability: sustainable yield; maintenance of biological 
diversity; internalization of environmental costs of economic activity 
through liability or administrative rules; transparency of policy; and 
public participation. 
 
Apr. 4, 2002). 
 18. See Kyoto Protocol: Status of Ratification, available at http://www.unfccc.de/ 
resource/kpstats.pdf (last updated Mar. 6, 2002) (lists signatories to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change). The full text of the Kyoto Protocol can be found 
in the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 
10, 1997, 37 I.h.n. 22, available at http://www.unfccc.de/resource/conv/index.html (last visited 
Jan. 13, 2001). 
 19. For example, as early as 1973, the United States demonstrated its commitment to 
preservation of biological diversity through enactment of the Endangered Species Act, 16 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1540 (Supp. 1999). The United States’ unwillingness to support many of 
these international environmental agreements stems in substantial part from disagreements with 
other countries about related issues raised by the agreements, such as proper intellectual 
property protection policy, redistributive policy issues, or proper trade policy, as opposed to 
disagreement on fundamental environmental protection principles. See, e.g., Saigo, supra note 
7, at 811-15. 
 20. JOHN E. SMITH, BIOTECHNOLOGY 159 (3d ed. 1996): 
For any technology to be considered sustainable it must not degrade the environment 
through either the overuse of resources or the creation of unbearable ecological 
burdens. It is becoming increasingly evident that humankind’s activities within the 
environment are far exceeding the sustainable capacity of the earth. In essence, the 
environmental load equals the size of the world’s population [multiplied by] the 
prosperity or welfare per head of population [multiplied by] the environmental use per 
unit of prosperity (welfare). 
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A. Sustainable yield  
The United States accepts as a matter of broad national policy that 
renewable resources, such as forests and crop land, should be 
managed in such a way that they will provide a sustainable, long term 
yield even where short term market considerations dictate 
otherwise.21 The United States imposes sustainable yield limitations 
on permitted harvests of public renewable resources, such as national 
forests.22 For many years, the federal government focused substantial 
resources on conserving private agricultural resources, such as soil.23 
In recent years, the federal government has become increasingly 
involved in limiting private resource losses through expanded 
conservation programs and increased attention to agricultural 
pollution.24  
B. Maintenance of Biological Diversity 
The United States accepts, as a matter of national policy, the basic 
ecological principle that biological diversity should be maintained if 
 
 21. See President’s Council on Sustainable Development, Sustainable America: A New 
Consensus for Prosperity, Opportunity, and A Healthy Environment for the Future (Feb. 1996), 
available at http://clinton2.nara.gov/PCSD/Publications/TF_Reports/amer-chap1.html, which 
sets forth “National Goals Toward Sustainable Development,” including the following: 
GOAL 4: CONSERVATION OF NATURE  
Use, conserve, protect, and restore natural resources—land, air, water, and 
biodiversity—in ways that help ensure long-term social, economic, and environmental 
benefits for ourselves and future generations.  
Id. 
 22. See, e.g., United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Forest Product 
Emphasis Areas, available at http://southernregion.fs.fed.us/planning/saa/sap_rx_10.htm (last 
visited Apr. 4, 2002) (describing “Sustained Yield Timber Management” practices utilized by 
the Forest Service). 
 23. See, e.g., J. JEFFREY GOEBEL, THE NATIONAL RESOURCES INVENTORY AND ITS ROLE 
IN U.S. AGRICULTURE (1998), available at http://www.statlab.iastate.edu/survey/nri (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2002) (providing a historical account of the federal government’s efforts to collect 
natural resource data since the 1930s). 
 24. For example, the Conservation Reserve Program, administered by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, offers cost-sharing and incentive payments to farmers who plant 
resource-conserving cover on their cropland. See Farm Service Agency Fact Sheet on the 
Conservation Reserve Program (Oct. 1999), available at http://www.fsa.usda.gov/pas/ 
publications/facts/html/crp99.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2002). 
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possible, and that government policy should require a searching and 
skeptical review of economic or ecological developments that 
significantly limit biological diversity.25 The United States, for 
example, invests billions of dollars per year in the maintenance of 
biological diversity through protection and operation of its national 
parks, forests, and wildlife refuges, and in restoration projects such as 
the Everglades restoration project.26 It also enforces the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA).27 In situations where the government is required 
to approve private action through a permit process, the government is 
committed by the ESA to prevent extinction of species absent a truly 
compelling justification.28  
C. Internalization of Environmental Costs of Economic Activity 
Through Liability or Administrative Rules 
The bedrock principle of government policy in regulating 
environmental costs in both the United States and Europe is that 
“polluters should pay.”29 Liability rules and administrative rules 
 
 25. See supra note 21 (stating the need to develop “measures of threats to habitat loss and 
the extent of habitat conversion, such as the rate of wetlands loss, [and to] decrease [] the 
number of threatened and endangered species,” to reflect how well the United States is 
contributing to the protection of natural systems world wide).  
 26. For example, the Department of the Interior reported spending of $10.3 billion for 
fiscal year 2002. See Offices of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States 
Government, Fiscal year 2003, Department of the Interior, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2003/bud17.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2002). 
 27. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1540 (Supp. 1999).  
 28. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
 29. In the United States, the principle that those whose activities create environmental 
externalities should be forced to bear or internalize the full costs of the externalities is generally 
accepted. It serves as the policy basis for major federal statutes such as the Superfund Law, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994), and is discussed as a foundation principle of environmental policy 
in most introductory environmental law texts. See, e.g., ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 37 (2d ed. 1998).  
 The EU also supports the “polluter pays” principle. European Commission, White Paper on 
Environmental Liability, Com 5 (2000). The EU has expressed a similar view on the need to 
assign a monetary value to externalities and thus to assist in controlling them. See Position 
Paper of the European Consultative Forum on the Env’t and Sustainable Dev.: EU sustainable 
dev. strategy § 3.3 (Oct. 30, 2000), available at www.europa.eu.int/comm/environment/ 
forum/agri.htm: 
“Externalities” are those environmental and social impacts which are not reflected in 
the price of goods and services. There are many ways in which these impacts can be 
recognised—for example through strategic environmental assessment or life cycle 
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should force the internalization of such social costs in the manner that 
lowers transaction costs to the maximum extent possible. There are at 
least two critical features of such a regulatory or liability system: (1) 
proper identification of the full social costs of an activity; and (2) 
choice of efficient methods of requiring internalization of those costs. 
The first element of cost internalization is of particular concern where 
the social costs of an activity are not obvious or correctly perceived, 
while its benefits are. This imbalance between the perception of 
actual costs and benefits existed in the early development of the U.S. 
chemical industry.30 As a result, chemical pollution of certain kinds 
accumulated for some years before its serious adverse effects became 
fully apparent, leading ultimately in some cases to a complete U.S. 
ban on continued use of the chemicals concerned.31 
A related issue is that of financial assurance requirements. 
Activities that involve unusually large amounts of risk to third parties 
or the environment should be conducted only by entities that can 
afford to bear the full financial cost of errors in the conduct of those 
activities so that society at large is not required to bear such costs.  
D. Transparency of Policy  
The United States accepts that the government should make clear 
to the public what its policy will be and the basis on which its policy 
has been and will be formulated. This responsibility includes a broad 
right of citizen access to information obtained by the government 
unless that information is subject to explicit statutory protection 
against disclosure of, for example, trade secret information.32 
 
assessment. Full account should be taken of hidden or neglected environmental and 
social external factors in decision-making at the policy, business and individual levels. 
They should be identified, quantified, and when possible given monetary value. 
 30. See generally RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (Fawcett Crest 1964) (1962); United 
States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 607 F. Supp. 1052 (W.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 31. The use of asbestos, a naturally occurring material, is another example of a situation 
where the benefits were obvious long before the major social costs became apparent. The result 
has been a social tragedy involving numerous fatalities, severe crippling illnesses, and industrial 
bankruptcies, as the U.S. tort liability system began to create a balance between the costs and 
benefits of asbestos use years after that use first began. 
 32. See, e.g., The United States Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). 
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E. Public Participation 
A distinctive feature of U.S. environmental law is that it 
authorizes substantial public participation in the process of forming 
and enforcing regulations for environmental protection.33 Unlike most 
other countries in the world, the United States accepts the concept 
that members of the public outside of the government should be 
given an opportunity to influence public policy through the indirect 
mechanism of electoral accountability and also through direct efforts 
to influence regulatory policy by public comment and court 
challenges to unlawful government action.  
III. POTENTIAL RISKS OF AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 
To analyze the existing U.S. regulatory system, it is necessary to 
consider the risks of agricultural biotechnology that must be 
regulated in order to achieve the claimed benefits of the technology. 
For purposes of this analysis, the author accepts the fundamental 
conclusion of the NRC Report that biotechnology is not “inherently 
dangerous.”34 However, biotechnology has the potential to create 
products that may give rise to human health or environmental risks. 
In some ways, these health and environmental risks are similar to 
those that can be created by conventional agriculture.35 According to 
 
 33. There are citizen suit provisions in virtually every major federal environmental law 
allowing private individuals to directly compel compliance through court action. See, e.g., 
Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994); Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365 
(1993); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 7002, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972 (1994); 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act § 310, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9659 (1994). A notable exception, pertinent to this article’s subject matter, is the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (Supp. 1999). 
 34. See NRC Report, supra note 1. This conclusion actually appears to be shared by at 
least certain elements within the EU. See European Comm’n, White Paper on Environmental 
Liability, 17 (Feb. 9, 2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/liability/ 
white_paper.htm (stating that “activities with respect to genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs), are not dangerous per se, but have the potential, in certain circumstances, to cause 
damage to health or significant environmental damage”).  
 
 35. For example, the common goldfish, created by conventional agricultural breeding, is 
now one of the most widely dispersed “exotic” species found in the United States, and is 
generally regarded as directly responsible for having caused the extinction of several native 
American fish species. See Office of Science and Technology Policy, CEQ/OSTP 
Assessment: Case Studies of Environmental Regulation for Biotechnology, Case Study One: 
Salmon plus sidebar, at 39, available at http://www.ostp.gov/html/012201.html (last visited 
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the NRC Report, “[T]oxicity, allergenicity, effects of gene flow, 
development of resistant pests, and effects on non-target species are 
concerns for both conventional and transgenic pest-protected 
plants.”36 
The NRC found that “the Committee is not aware of any evidence 
that foods on the market are unsafe to eat as a result of genetic 
modification.”37 At the same time, however, as discussed below, the 
NRC agreed that considerable additional research and regulatory 
review should be conducted to assess certain key risks posed by 
future pest-protected plants.  
In addition, biotechnology has the ability to create risks that 
cannot be created by conventional agriculture. Agricultural 
biotechnology can introduce into a species novel genetic materials 
that cannot be introduced by conventional breeding techniques.38 
Moreover, genetically engineered plants and animals may have 
characteristics that permit them to be relatively successful in 
competing with wild varieties of these plants and animals in the 
short-run, but the genetically engineered organism may also lack 
certain characteristics of the wild varieties making them more 
vulnerable to eventual extinction in the long-run. Theoretically, the 
result is that a genetically engineered crop variety could first 
extinguish its wild-type competitors and then itself be extinguished.39 
Critics of genetically engineered agriculture raise specific risks, 
discussed below, that they contend are of major concern.40  
In analyzing these alleged risks, it is important to bear the 
following points clearly in mind. First, many of these risks or costs of 
agricultural biotechnology are also risks or costs associated with 
conventional agricultural practices. Therefore, the agricultural 
 
Mar. 19, 2002) [hereinafter Case Studies], reprinted in ANDERSON ET AL., BIOTECHNOLOGY 
DESKBOOK 151 (2001) [hereinafter Deskbook]. Similarly, the National Academy of Sciences 
points out that the conventional breeding of potatoes for certain desirable characteristics has in 
some cases caused potentially harmful increases in the levels of certain known toxins found in 
potatoes. See NRC Report supra note 1, at 70.  
 36. NRC Report, supra note 1, at 6. 
 37. Id. at 8 (emphasis added). 
 38. Id. at 23-24. 
 39. See Case Studies, supra note 35, Case Study One at 43; supra note 35, at 155. 
 40. Most of the following alleged risks are discussed by Holly Saigo. See Saigo, supra 
note 7, at 787-96 (footnotes omitted).  
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biotechnology regulatory system must compare the marginal costs 
associated with agricultural biotechnology with its marginal benefits. 
The proper performance of the agricultural biotechnology regulatory 
and liability system depends upon whether it properly compares the 
marginal costs of agricultural biotechnology to the marginal benefits 
on a life-cycle basis. 
Second, the relevant comparison of marginal benefits and costs of 
agricultural biotechnology is not simply conventional agricultural 
means for producing similar food or feed, but the total social costs 
required to sustain such conventional agricultural practices. For 
example, if conventional agricultural practices require large amounts 
of pesticide use in order to protect their crops, and these pesticides 
can be eliminated or sharply reduced by use of biotechnology crops, 
then this change would clearly be a marginal benefit of 
biotechnology. However, this marginal benefit needs to be weighed 
against the cost involved, such as increases in the rate at which crop 
pest became resistant to a particular type of genetically engineered 
pest control compared to the comparable conventional control.  
The objective of agricultural biotechnology regulation should be 
to minimize the total social cost of agricultural production, not 
simply to limit one aspect of that cost while ignoring increases in cost 
in other areas. In short, successful regulation must involve a full, 
open accounting for total social life-cycle costs and must permit 
analysis of marginal benefits and costs. 
IV. ALLEGED MAJOR RISKS OF AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 
A. Migration of Transgenes into Non-Target Organisms 
According to Saigo: 
The overarching concern about transgenic plants is that the 
engineered genes will migrate or escape into other organisms. 
The most likely way for plants to exchange transgenes is 
through outcrossing. Outcrossing is the process through which 
domesticated plants hybridize with wild relatives, producing a 
new variety. Although outcrossing is a common occurrence in 
conventional agronomy, outcrossing in transgenic plants may 
occur at significantly higher rates. Startlingly, a recent study 
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found that genes from transgenic plants might be up to twenty 
times more likely to outcross into relative species than the 
plant’s natural genetic material.41 
Other observers of biotechnology, however, suggest that the risk 
of such genetic migration is not large: 
The possibility of gene transfer to compatible wild relatives 
has been given serious examination. Is it possible that 
herbicide and pest resistance incorporated into transgenic 
plants could find its way into other species and increase their 
‘weediness’? Under normal conditions gene transfer between 
close relatives is a very rare phenomenon and there is little 
evidence this will change with transgenic organisms. While 
such events are theoretically possible, their occurrence would 
be at such a low frequency that in practice the results are of 
virtually no consequence or concern.42 
The NRC Report essentially states that there is insufficient 
empirical evidence to make a decision about the seriousness of this 
alleged risk of gene migration.43 
 
 41. See id. at 787 (footnotes omitted). 
 42. SMITH, supra note 20, at 215. 
 43. NRC Report, supra note 1, at 88-89 (emphasis added). The report states: 
We know little about the extent to which insects and diseases limit wild, weedy 
populations that are sexually compatible with cultivated species. Critics of 
biotechnology argue that the spread of beneficial traits could quickly lead to the spread 
of weeds; advocates of transgenic crops maintain that this risk is small or nonexistent. 
Empirical data with which to address the question are lacking . . . . 
Because of the uncertainties described above, it is premature to predict the ecological 
impacts of gene flow from transgenic pest-protected plants. Meanwhile, regulatory 
decisions must be made in a timely fashion. It seems unlikely that the transfer of one or 
two novel crop genes for pest-protection would transform a wild species into a 
problematic weed, although in some cases unwanted population increases of weedy 
species could result. Moreover, the cumulative effects of beneficial crop genes could 
potentially lead to expensive and ecologically damaging problems in weeds that are 
already difficult to control, such as Johnson grass (Sorghum halepense) . . . . 
Consequences of gene flow other than weediness are also perceived to be detrimental 
to preserving biodiversity. For example, the spread of transgenes to wild relatives that 
are rare or endangered is sometimes considered as a potential ecological risk, 
especially in regions that are centers of diversity for crop relatives . . . . 
Id. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol9/iss1/7
p245 Van Cleve book pages.doc  12/18/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002]  Regulating Environmentalists 261 
 
The considerations noted in the Report led the NRC to 
recommend that “[c]riteria for evaluating the merit of 
commercializing a new transgenic pest-protected plant should include 
whether gene flow to feral plants or wild relatives is likely to have a 
significant impact on these populations.”44 
This NRC recommendation would constitute a marked change 
from current EPA regulatory practice, which apparently disregards 
the impact of gene outcrossing to conventionally bred relatives of the 
pest-protected plants. According to the EPA’s analysis of the 
permitting process for MON810, a variety of BT-corn has: 
[t]he potential for outcrossing to traditional cultivars of maize 
from MON810 or other registered plant-pesticides is not 
currently reviewed within the guidelines (40 CFR). Since the 
mammalian toxicity and environmental evaluations have 
indicated that the plant-pesticidal substance (i.e., d-endotoxin) 
is not a threat to man or the environment, there is not a risk 
associated with MON810 pollen fertilizing traditional maize. 
Traditional culture methods and breeding (i.e., seed 
production) have resulted in cross-pollination between open 
pollinated varieties, hybrids and inbred lines for centuries with 
no known ill effects. This has similarly transferred genes for 
disease and insect resistance between varieties in the past.45 
B. Increased Creation of Resistant Weeds and Pests 
A well-established limitation of conventional weed and pest 
control through herbicides and pesticides is that weeds and pests can 
develop effective resistance to them over time.46  
 
 44. Id. at 92. 
 45. See Case Studies, supra note 35, Case Study Two: Bt-Maize plus sidebar, at 21; 
Deskbook, supra note 35, at 180; see also discussion of Mexican maize issue, infra notes 155-
61 and accompanying text. 
 46. A striking example of this phenomenon is need for rebreeding of the American wheat 
crop to protect it from various forms of wheat rust, which are fungi. The fungi develop 
resistance within approximately five years, so the wheat crop must be rebred within that period 
of time. See NRC Report, supra note 1, at 104-08. 
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Although the inheritance of resistance through outcrossing is 
not unique to biotechnology, this type of interaction is 
arguably more dangerous than that posed by conventional 
breeding techniques. Combined with the rapidity with which 
transgenes may jump into wild populations and the high levels 
of immunity transgenes can confer, the threat of the superweed 
is one that cannot be ignored. There are already examples of 
herbicide resistant genes that have migrated from transgenic 
oilseed rape and sugar beet into wild relatives.47 
The NRC acknowledged concerns regarding the possibility of 
increased weediness when it found that “transfer of either 
conventionally bred or transgenic resistance traits to weedy relatives 
potentially could exacerbate weed problems, but such problems have 
not been observed or adequately studied.”48 
Both the EPA and the NRC Reports acknowledge concerns about 
increased pest-resistance as a result of the use of pest-protected 
plants. The EPA imposes restrictions on the planting of certain 
genetically modified pest-protected plants (GMPPs) during the 
registration process that are specifically designed to limit the increase 
in resistance by pests exposed to pest-protected plants.49 The NRC 
 
 47. See Saigo, supra note 7, at 789-90 (footnotes omitted).  
 48. NRC Report, supra note 1, at 9. 
 49. One article describes this process of EPA restriction with respect to Bt corn as 
follows:  
One of the principal concerns still under study by government, academia, and industry 
is the possibility that placing the B.t. protein in the plant where it is expressed at all 
times might accelerate the development of resistance to the protein in the pest 
population. To date the only documented case of resistance to the protein resulted from 
the use of the conventional B.t. sprays. Nevertheless, the EPA has consulted with the 
USDA and panels of outside scientific advisors on the resistance issue and has 
mandated additional risk mitigation measures for B.t. crops to minimize the likelihood 
of insect resistance developing to B.t. products, conventional or genetically 
engineered. These measures include post-market monitoring for resistance and the 
evaluation of new monitoring methods. The majority of these new requirements have 
been applied to B.t. corn and cotton products and are included in insect resistance 
management (“IRM”) plans that must be approved by the agency and implemented 
under the direction of the registrants.  
See Stanley H. Abramson & J. Thomas Carrato, Crop Biotechnology: The Case for 
Product Stewardship, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 241, 258 (2001) (internal footnotes 
omitted).  
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Report recommends further systematic study of this issue because it 
concludes that the rate at which such pest resistance will develop 
cannot be predicted based on current scientific knowledge.50  
C. Potential Adulteration of Foods by Transgenes 
Both in Europe and the United States, there are concerns about the 
human health effects of genetically engineered foods.51 At present, 
the United States and Europe both lack monitoring systems to track 
such health effects from genetically modified foods or feed. The EU 
has proposed regulations, discussed below, to require “traceability,” 
which would essentially create a tracking system to permit review of 
health effects.52 The United States does not presently require 
genetically modified food labeling, crop segregation, or other 
measures that could be used to provide tracking capability, since such 
capability is deemed unnecessary.53 
According to Saigo: “Studies have shown substantial and 
potentially dangerous differences between some of the transgenic 
products and their unmodified counterparts. For example, soybeans 
modified to contain genes from brazil nuts were found to contain 
brazil nut allergens, posing potential problems for individuals who 
are allergic to nuts.”54 
 
 50. See NRC Report, supra note 1, at 9. 
 51. See, e.g., David Barboza, As Biotech Crops Multiply, Consumers Get Little Choice, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2001, at 1. 
 52. See infra Part V.B. 
 53. For example, the FDA does not require genetically modified food to bear special 
labeling, because there is no evidence that such foods “present any different or greater safety 
concern than foods developed by traditional plant breeding.” Statement of Policy: Foods 
Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22984 (May 29, 1992). As a result of the 
Starlink™ corn regulatory failure, discussed below, the EPA now states that as a matter of 
policy it will not permit registration of a genetically modified food source unless it is deemed 
safe for both human and animal consumption. In and of itself, this step does not provide GMO 
monitoring or tracing capability, however. 
 54. See Saigo, supra note 7, at 792 (footnotes omitted).  
As a result of these laboratory findings, these soybeans were never commercially marketed: 
In the mid-1990’s the seed company Pioneer Hi-bred dropped plans to commercialize 
transgenic soybeans containing a gene from Brazil nuts after research showed that the 
soybeans would cause allergic reactions in Brazil nut allergic individuals.  
The potential addition of new allergens to foods via genetic engineering is a serious 
public health concern. Roughly 2.5 to 5 million Americans suffer from food allergies. 
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The NRC acknowledged the legitimacy of concerns about 
possible allergenicity, but noted that there is a lack of available direct 
scientific methods to test for allergenicity.55 The NRC therefore 
recommended development of better testing methodologies so that 
this issue can be examined before foods are commercialized.56 The 
NRC Report further states that new GMPP cultivars “will need to be 
monitored for impacts that could not have been detected in the 
laboratory experiments” that reviewed health and safety issues.57 The 
NRC acknowledged the need to address concerns regarding toxicity 
resulting from pest-protected plants and recommended that long term 
toxicity testing may be warranted “[f]or some novel pest-protectants 
developed for future commercialization.”58  
D. Non-Target Species Impacts 
Over the past year or two, there has been considerable controversy 
about the possibility that genetically modified pest-protected plants 
could have direct or indirect unintended harmful consequences on 
 
Although reactions in many individuals are limited to unpleasant symptoms such as 
gastrointestinal distress or skin rashes, allergic reactions in some individuals can cause 
anaphylactic shock and death.  
Unfortunately, there is currently no predictive methodology for testing the 
allergenicity of most proteins introduced to foods via genetic engineering. Testing is 
only possible for proteins from commonly allergenic foods such as nuts. Blood serum 
is available from individuals with common food allergies, thus allowing proteins from 
commonly allergenic foods to be screened for “antibody-antigen” reactions. However, 
for most proteins, including those from foods that are not commonly allergenic and 
those from non-food sources such as bacteria, no such testing is possible. In other 
words, most proteins added to foods via genetic engineering cannot be tested for 
allergenicity.  
Testimony of Rebecca J. Goldburg, Ph.D., Senior Staff Scientist, Environmental Defense Fund 
and Member, National Research Council Committee on Genetically Modified Pest-Protected 
Plants, before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Science, 
Subcommittee on Basic Research, at 3 (Oct. 5, 1999), available at http://www.house.gov/ 
science/goldburg_100599.htm. 
 55. See NRC Report, supra note 1, at 7. 
 56. Id. at 7. 
 57. Id. at 96. 
 58. Id. at 8: 
The EPA should provide clear, scientifically justifiable criteria for establishing 
biochemical and functional equivalency when registrants request permission to test 
non plant-expressed proteins in lieu of expressed proteins. 
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non-target organisms. For example, there is disagreement over 
studies showing that Bt-corn toxins can kill monarch butterflies, 
which often feed on milkweed found in and around cornfields.59 
Industry acknowledges that Bt-corn toxins can harm monarch 
butterflies, which are from a family similar to the family that the 
toxins are in fact designed to kill.60 Industry supporters, however, 
argue that very little corn pollen lands on milkweed leaves, and 
therefore monarch larvae would only be exposed to pollen in 
concentrations too small to harm them.61 
The NRC clearly believed that the risk of impacts on non-target 
organisms is a risk worth careful consideration in the regulatory 
process. For example, the NRC Report notes: “If a pest-protected 
plant causes dramatic decreases in some herbivore or omnivore 
populations, there will be less nutrient material for the next level in 
the food chain. It is theoretically possible that a specialized predator, 
parasite, or pathogen of an affected herbivore could become locally 
extinct.”62 
The EPA’s registration of MON810 and other Bt-corn varieties, 
has now become controversial.63 Environmentalists believe that 
during registration, the EPA did not require sufficient analysis of the 
impact of Bt-corn plants that produced lepidopteran toxins on non-
target species, such as the monarch butterfly.64 Environmentalists 
note that there are approximately nineteen non-target butterfly and 
moth species that are either threatened or endangered and feed in or 
near Bt cornfields.65 The NRC Report agrees that impacts on 
nontarget lepidopterans are likely at least where Cry1A Bt toxins are 
concerned.66 
The NRC Report points out, however, that the impact of pest 
protected plant toxins on non-target species needs to be compared to 
 
 59. See Deskbook, supra note 35, at 13. 
 60. See, e.g., Biotechnology Industry Organization, Backgrounder on Monarch Butterflies 
at Bt. Crops, available at http://www.bio.org/food&ag/monarch.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2002). 
 61. Id. 
 62. NRC Report, supra note 1, at 72. 
 63. Id. at 75. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.. 
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the impact of pesticides. There might be a net biodiversity benefit 
resulting from the use of the pest-protected plants. The NRC Report 
finds that both pest-protected and conventional crops “could have 
effects on nontarget species, but these potential impacts on nontarget 
organisms are generally expected to be smaller than the impacts of 
broad spectrum synthetic insecticides, and therefore, the use of pest-
protected plants could lead to greater biodiversity in agroecosystems 
where they replace the use of those insecticides.”67 
The NRC went on to recommend that “[c]riteria for evaluating the 
merit of commercializing a new transgenic pest-protected plant 
should include the anticipated impacts on nontarget organisms 
compared with those of currently used pest control techniques.”68 
E. Crop Plants and Biodiversity Effects 
Both conventional agricultural plant breeding practice and 
genetically engineered plants share the risk of biodiversity loss. 
Biodiversity is important not as an end in itself, but rather as a 
protection against possible vulnerability of part of an overall 
ecosystem to attack by predators. The more prominent a single 
variety of a crop plant becomes, for example, the more susceptible 
the agricultural system is to large scale failure in the event that the 
prominent variety comes under attack by a pest resistant to control or 
a new disease.69 Whether this risk is larger in the case of genetically 
engineered crops than in the case of conventional agriculture is 
difficult to assess. In either case, the prominence of a crop variety is 
probably largely a matter of the perceived relative economics of 
planting than crop variety at a given time. In other words, the more 
economic savings there appear to be from producing a given crop 
variety, the more likely it is that the less costly crop variety will be 
planted. It is important, in short, that the market be given proper 
signals by regulators so that there is no artificial bias in favor of a 
particular crop variety, whether produced by conventional crop 
 
 67. Id. at 80 (emphasis added). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Saigo gives two prominent examples of large scale crop failures that resulted from a 
lack of genetic diversity flowing from conventional crossbreeding: the Irish potato famine and 
the Southern corn blight in the early 1970s. See Saigo, supra note 7, at 795-96.  
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breeding or genetic engineering. To the extent that market failure 
concerns may, in some cases, require regulations for sustainable yield 
and biodiversity protection, such concerns would apply equally to 
agricultural biotechnology and conventional agriculture.  
The NRC acknowledged the need for long term environmental 
monitoring of pest-protected crops. In one of its recommendations, 
the NRC noted the need to “[m]onitor ecological impacts of pest-
protected crops on a long term basis to ensure the detection of 
impacts that may not be predicted from tests conducted during the 
regulatory approval process.”70 
V. EXISTING AND PROPOSED REGULATION OF AGRICULTURAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY IN UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 
A. United States 
The existing regulation of agricultural biotechnology in the United 
States is based on the 1986 Coordinated Framework for the 
Regulation of Biotechnology (Coordinated Framework), created by 
presidential authority based on existing legislation.71 The Coordinated 
Framework divided biotechnology regulatory authority between three 
regulatory agencies: the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the EPA.72 The idea 
was that each agency would regulate those biotechnology products 
that corresponded to the conventional products subject to regulation 
under that agency’s existing legal authorities. Over the subsequent 
ten years, these agencies established policies to guide their use of 
legislative authorities under which they regulated various aspects of 
biotechnology.73 During this same period, Congress did not approve 
any legislation specifically altering biotechnology regulation, and 
none has received Administration support.74 
 
 70. NRC Report, supra note 1, at 10 (emphasis omitted). 
 71. Id. at 10-11. 
 72. Id. at 11. 
 73. Id. 
 
 74. There were amendments during that period to some of the prior regulatory statutes 
under which the agencies now also regulate biotechnology products. For example, the EPA’s 
pesticide regulatory authorities were modernized by congressional action. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. 
§ 136(66) (Supp. 1999) (Defining “unreasonable adverse effects on the environment” to include 
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In theory, the Coordinated Framework should have provided for 
comprehensive review of agricultural biotechnology. However, 
although there was a division of jurisdiction within the framework, 
control over transgenic pest-protected plants was not addressed by 
the original framework document.75 Perhaps it did not occur to 
regulators who claimed they created a comprehensive framework for 
biotechnology regulation that within a few years’ creation of such 
plants would either be possible or desirable. Although the EPA 
proposed a rule to cover pesticidal substances in pest-protected plants 
in 1994, this rule is not yet finalized.76 In recognition of this 
unfortunate state of affairs, the NRC concluded that “there is an 
urgency to complete the regulatory framework for transgenic plant 
products because of the potential diversity of novel traits that could 
be introduced by transgenic methods and because of the rapid rate of 
adoption of and public controversy regarding transgenic crops.”77  
1. USDA Regulation for Plant Protection 
The USDA is responsible for regulating plants, including 
genetically altered organisms, under the Plant Protection Act (PPA) 
which gives the USDA the authority to: 
prohibit or restrict the importation, entry, exportation, or 
movement in interstate commerce of any plant, plant product, 
biological control organism . . . if the Secretary determines that 
the prohibition or restriction is necessary to prevent the 
introduction into the United States or the dissemination of a 
plant pest or noxious weed within the United States.78 
The USDA exercises this authority under a permit system run by 
the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). APHIS 
issues field test permits for new plants that have the potential to 
 
human dietary risks from pesticide residues on foods, for purposes of pesticide registration 
under FIFRA.). Some consideration was given during the Clinton Administration to possible 
new systematic biotechnology legislation, but none was ever proposed. See, e.g., William Y. 
Brown, Promise and Peril, The Environmental Forum, 38 (Sept.-Oct. 2001).  
 75. See NRC Report, supra note 1, at 145. 
 76. See supra note 3. 
 77. NRC Report, supra note 1, at 11. 
 
 78. Deskbook, supra note 35, at 15 (quoting 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7772) (2000)). 
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create pest problems in domestic agriculture, which could include 
articles developed through biotechnology.79 
The APHIS permitting process applies to “regulated articles,” 
defined as “any organism which has been altered or produced through 
genetic engineering,” if the donor organism belongs to certain genera 
or taxa and meets the definition of a “plant pest.”80 “Plant pest” is 
broadly defined, encompassing “direct or indirect injury, disease, or 
damage not just to agricultural crops, but also to plants in general, for 
example, native species, as well as to organisms that may be 
beneficial to plants, for example, honeybees.”81  
APHIS permits control the “introduction” of a regulated article, 
which includes importation, interstate movement, or release into the 
environment.82 Therefore, the permitting scheme applies only  
when a person seeks to introduce genetically engineered 
organisms into the environment or interstate commerce. A 
typical permit will cover small-scale field testing of a 
genetically engineered plant prior to commercialization. While 
APHIS automatically requires a permit if the donor or recipient 
organism is a known plant pest, it reserves the right to require 
a permit for a product it has “reason to believe” is a plant 
pest.83  
Thus, USDA regulatory review of agricultural biotechnology is 
limited to whether the proposed biotechnology application involves 
the creation of a “plant pest” which will be released into the 
 
 79. See id. at 17. 
 80. See id. “Regulated article status has been applied to most of the genetically modified 
plants that have been developed to date.” Id. 
 81. See id. at 15.  
 82. See id. at 17. 
 83. Abramson & Carrato, supra note 49, at 247-48 (internal footnotes omitted). Abramson 
and Carrato note:  
APHIS has issued some 932 permits for genetically engineered organisms since the 
program began in 1987, primarily for small-scale field tests involving crop plants. 
Based on its experience with the permit program, APHIS has provided a number of 
exemptions for articles which do not pose a plant pest risk. One of the more significant 
exemptions authorizes the introduction of certain regulated articles without a permit, 
provided that APHIS is notified in advance.  
Id. 
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environment. If no “plant pest” is involved, then the USDA’s 
regulatory review is complete. The NRC Report notes that the narrow 
scope of USDA’s regulations may prevent the agency from 
regulating some genetically engineered crops that it wishes to 
regulate.84 The USDA does not actually consider in its regulatory 
review process many of the potential biotechnology risks discussed 
above that may adversely affect agriculture. 
2. FDA Regulation for Food Safety  
Food safety is regulated by the FDA under the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA).85 The FFDCA defines “food” as: 
“(1) articles used for food or drink for man or other animals, (2) 
chewing gum, and (3) articles used for components of any such 
article.”86 FDA approval is not required prior to marketing a food, but 
there are prohibitions against misbranding or adulterating food.87 
Genetically modified food could fall under the FDA’s pre-market 
approval authority if it is considered adulterated, based, for example, 
on a finding that the modification is an “unsafe food additive.”88 
Similarly, genetically modified food could be found to be 
“misbranded” if the food is not described on its label by “a common 
or usual name.”89 
A food additive may include “any substance the intended use of 
which results or may reasonably be expected to result, directly or 
indirectly, in its becoming a component . . . of any food . . . .”90 
However, certain substances are not considered food additives 
because they are “GRAS,” or “generally recognized, among experts 
qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate [their] 
safety as having been adequately shown . . . to be safe under the 
conditions of its intended use.”91  
 
 84. See NRC Report, supra note 1, at 161. 
 85. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1997). 
 86. See Deskbook, supra note 35, at 25 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 321(f) (Supp. 1998)) . 
 87. See 21 U.S.C. § 331 (1997). 
 88. See Deskbook, supra note 35, at 25. 
 89. See id. at 26. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 27. 
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The FDA does not regulate biotechnology foods differently than 
those produced through conventional breeding and does not require 
pre-market approval or special labeling of such foods.92 In 1992, the 
FDA published a policy statement for foods derived from new plant 
varieties, which states that FDA may use its authority over food 
additives, under FFDCA section 409, to require pre-market approval 
where necessary to protect public health.93 Although genetic material 
transferred to plants through biotechnology is “presumed to be 
GRAS,” and hence not normally regulated as a food additive, an 
“expression product,” or substance introduced into food because of 
the genetic engineering such as carbohydrates, fats, and oils, may be 
regulated as a food additive.94  
One key result of the FDA’s 1992 policy is that manufacturers of 
genetically modified foods are not required to label those foods as 
genetically modified because the FDA does not regard them as less 
safe than conventionally produced foods.95 Another result is that 
developers of biotechnology foods are not required to consult the 
FDA prior to marketing their products, although they are encouraged 
to do so.96 In January 2001, the FDA proposed regulations, discussed 
 
 92. See id. 
 93. See Abramson & Carrato, supra note 49, at 251. 
 94. See id. at 251-52. 
 95. See Cliff D. Weston, Chilling Of The Corn: Agricultural Biotechnology In The Face 
of U.S. Patent Law And The Cartagena Protocol, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 377, 407 
(2000) (footnotes omitted): 
Proponents [of GMO labeling] argue that the information should be made available to 
give the consumer the choice of purchasing GMO or traditional products. They assert 
that agricultural biotech companies should have no objections to labeling since the 
industry claims the products are safe. Critics of the plan respond that much of the 
resistance to GMOs has been based on hype and unreasonableness rather than 
objective science. They claim that labeling would amount to placing a “skull and 
crossbones” on the products and that labeling is unnecessary under the FDA 
guidelines. 
 96. See Abramson & Carrato, supra note 49, at 252-53. However, although consultation is 
not mandated:  
[a]s a practical matter, companies developing new biotechnology food products have 
routinely consulted with FDA scientists as an integral part of their product stewardship 
programs. Through calendar year 2000, the FDA has conducted 49 final consultations 
under its 1992 policy . . . . A letter from the FDA acknowledging completion of the 
consultation process is evidence of a final consultation. The letter provides assurance 
to potential customers that the product has been reviewed by federal food safety 
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below, that would require premarket notification to the FDA before 
introduction of genetically modified foods.97 
3. EPA Regulation of Pesticides 
The EPA has statutory authority to regulate the manufacture, 
importation, sale, and use of pesticides under the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).98 The EPA further 
regulates pesticides under the FFDCA, which requires that the EPA 
establish a tolerance for pesticides used for food or animal feed.99 
Under FIFRA, any pesticide, which is “any substance or mixture 
which is intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating 
a pest . . . .” sold or used in the United States, must be registered with 
the EPA.100 The intended use of a product governs whether it is a 
pesticide and intent is present where “(a) the seller claims, states or 
implies that a substance can be used as a pesticide; (b) the substance 
has no other commercially valuable use except as a pesticide; or (c) 
the seller has actual or constructive knowledge that the substance will 
or is intended to be used as a pesticide.”101 Sale or distribution of a 
pesticide is prohibited without EPA registration, which will be 
granted where the pesticide is effective, the labeling meets certain 
statutory requirements under FIFRA, and the expected use will not 
cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.102 
Any substance that is a pesticide under FIFRA and is used on food 
or feed crops is subject to regulation under the FFDCA, and the EPA 
 
officials and also demonstrates that the developer has met the prevailing “standard of 
care” for such products. 
Id. 
 97. See Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706 (Jan. 18, 
2001); see also Abramson & Carrato, supra note 49, at 252-53. 
 98. See Deskbook, supra note 35, at 33. 
 99. See id. (stating that a “tolerance” is the “maximum level of pesticide residue that may 
be present in food or animal feed”). 
 100. See id. (defining a “pest” as “any insect, rodent, nematode, fungus, weed, or any other 
form of terrestrial or aquatic plant or animal life or virus, bacteria, or other microorganism, 
except microorganisms on or in living man or other living animals”). 
 101. See id. 
 102. See id at 34. 
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must establish a tolerance for the pesticide.103 The EPA may register a 
pesticide for use on food or animal feed for these three reasons: if any 
residue will fall within the established tolerance; if the EPA grants an 
exemption from the tolerance requirement; or, if the pesticide is 
GRAS.104 The EPA may exempt a pesticide from FIFRA 
requirements if the pesticide is adequately regulated by another 
agency or if the EPA determines that the pesticide poses “no 
unreasonable risk.”105  
In 1994, the Biopesticides and Pollution Prevention Division was 
established within the EPA’s Office of Pesticides and Prevention and 
is responsible for registering “biopesticides,” which are derived from 
natural materials such as plants, animals, or microorganisms.106 The 
EPA extended its FIFRA authority to genetically engineered 
pesticides and regulates them as “plant pesticides,” defined as “a 
pesticidal substance that is produced in a living plant and the genetic 
materials necessary for [its] production . . . where . . . intended for 
use in the living plant.”107 As discussed above, the EPA issued a final 
rule on July 19, 2001 that generally outlines its approach to plant 
pesticides (PIPs), but does not address all outstanding issues 
regarding substances that will be exempted from the FIFRA 
requirements. 
B. Trends in European Regulation 
European regulation consists of EU regulations and directives, but 
can also be considered to include international agreements to which 
the EU subscribes, such as the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol, and EU 
liability rules governing agricultural biotechnology. This section 
sketches out recent EU regulatory proposals as a basis for comparison 
with the U.S. regulatory system.  
 
 103. See id. at 33. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 35.  
 106. See id. at 36. 
 107. See id.  
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1. Tracing/Labeling/Premarket Reviews 
The European Community proposed genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) premarket review and tracing regulations. The 
proposed tracing regulations are described generally by the European 
Commission as follows: 108 
[T]he [regulations will provide the] ability to trace GMOs and 
products produced from GMOs at all stages of the placing on 
the market throughout the production and distribution chains 
facilitating quality control and also the possibility to withdraw 
products. Importantly, effective traceability provides a ‘safety 
net’ should any unforeseen adverse effects be established. The 
retroactive tracking of the movement of GMOs and products 
produced from GMOs through the production and distribution 
chains will be facilitated by traceability requirements based on 
transmission and retention of relevant information for such 
products, at all stages of their placing on the market.109 
 
 108. See Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council Concerning Traceability and Labelling of Genetically 
Modified Organisms and Traceability of Food and Feed Products Produced From Genetically 
Modified Organisms and Amending Directive, 2001/18/EC, 2-3 (July 25, 2001). 
 109. Id. at 2-3. According to the Commission,  
such a traceability “system” limits discontinuity of product specific information 
through the chains and thereby facilitates:  
• withdrawal of products should an unforeseen risk to human health or the 
environment be established; 
• targeted monitoring of potential effects on human health or the environment, 
where appropriate; 
• control and verification of labelling claims.  
Id. According to the report of the U.S.-European Union Consultative Forum: 
Effective monitoring requires the ability to trace the presence of genetically modified 
products. At the present time, no obvious health effects have yet been identified with 
crops or foods that have been approved. Anticipated effects are likely to be of low-
level, evident only after long periods of use among especially at risk population 
groups, difficult to detect with certainty and thus, monitoring for such effects is likely 
to be costly to implement. However, the capacity to trace these products is essential to 
ensuring consumer choice, understanding the causes and establishing liability in cases 
of unanticipated negative effects, ensuring effective product recall should a safety 
problem arise, and, in some cases, validating benefit claims.  
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The traceability regulations would impose a series of requirements 
on participants in various stages of the food production and 
distribution process for information transfer and recordkeeping on 
GMOs designed to make it possible, among other things, to institute a 
recall of genetically modified food in the event human health 
concerns necessitated a recall.110 The United States has no 
comparable regulations. 
The European Commission (EC) also recently proposed new 
European regulations on labeling and safety review of genetically 
modified food and feed.111 These regulations would require 
mandatory premarket safety review of genetically modified food and 
feed, and authorize new, broader GMO labeling requirements for 
such products. The United States has no comparable requirements. 
2. Cartagena Biosafety Protocol 
The Cartagena Biosafety Protocol, to which the EU subscribes, 
contains a number of key provisions, including provisions requiring 
labeling of GMO food and feed, and the “precautionary principle.”112 
 
Consultative Forum, supra note 15, at 12.  
 110. See Commission on the European Communities, supra note 109, at 2-3. 
 111. See id. 
 112. Weston describes the precautionary principle provision and the issues it raises as 
follows. 
The Protocol declares that:  
[L]ack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information and 
knowledge . . . shall not prevent [a subscribing country] from taking a decision 
regarding GMO imports. This provision permits countries to apply the precautionary 
principle in addressing GM imports. The principle permits a country to take action to 
protect itself—by barring import of a genetically modified organism—even if there is 
a lack of scientific certainty it would be dangerous. The immediate concern for the 
U.S. biotech industry is that this principle will allow Europe and other nations to 
improperly implement isolationist or protectionist policies to aid their domestic 
industries. The determination of the level of insufficiency of scientific evidence is 
placed in the hands of those contemplating GM product bans rather than in an 
impartial body. Having to present evidence of absolute safety is an insurmountable 
burden; the question of how far below that threshold scientific certainty may fall 
before becoming insufficient is left to officials balancing civic duties with the need to 
appease their constituencies. A nation desirous of domestic industrial or agricultural 
protection, a goal generally not permitted by the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (GATT), may now undertake such protection under the auspices of the              
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3. EC White Paper on Environmental Liability  
In early 2000, after lengthy deliberations, the EC developed a 
White Paper on Environmental Liability (White Paper) that will serve 
as the basis for European Community regulations on environmental 
liability to be developed over the next several years.113 The White 
Paper recognizes that, under the EC Treaty, European Community 
policy on the environment “shall contribute to pursuit (among other 
things) of the objective of protecting human health.” 114 
The EC outlines in its White Paper the goals for an EU 
environmental liability regime generally and as applied to 
biotechnology.115 The EU’s White Paper comes to the same 
fundamental conclusion reached by U.S. regulatory authorities, that 
GMO activities are not inherently dangerous, but they do have the 
 
Protocol. It invites nations to overweigh concerns based on public opinion in order to 
declare the perceived risks too great to be assuaged by the available scientific findings. 
Weston, supra note 95, at 405. 
 113. European Comm’n, White Paper on Environmental Liability (Feb. 9, 2000) 
[hereinafter EU White Paper]. 
 114. Id. § 4.2.1. 
 115. Id. § 4.2.2 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added): 
The objective of nearly all national environmental liability regimes is to cover 
activities that bear an inherent risk of causing damage. Many of such activities are 
currently regulated by Community environmental legislation, or Community 
legislation that has an environmental objective along with other objectives. A coherent 
framework for the liability regime needs to be linked with the relevant EC legislation 
on protection of the environment. In addition to ensuring restoration of the 
environment where this is currently not possible, the liability regime would therefore 
also provide . . . legislation in the field of biotechnology; and legislation in the field of 
transport of dangerous substances. In the further shaping of an EC initiative, the scope 
of activities will need to be defined with more precision, for instance by setting up a 
list of all the pieces of relevant EC legislation with which the liability regime should 
be linked. Moreover, some of these activities, such as activities with respect to 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs), are not dangerous per se, but have the 
potential, in certain circumstances, to cause damage to health or significant 
environmental damage. This could be the case, for example, in the event of an escape 
from a high-level containment facility or from unforeseen results of a deliberate 
release. For this reason, it is considered appropriate for such activities to come within 
the scope of a Community-wide liability regime. In these cases, the precise definition 
of the regime, for instance the defences to be allowed, might not be the same for all 
activities related to GMOs, but may have to be differentiated according to the relevant 
legislation and the activities concerned. 
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potential in some cases to cause health or environmental damage.116 
The White Paper apparently proposes to include GMO related 
activities within the general ambit of the strict liability regime it 
envisions for environmental harms.117 Although the White Paper does 
not provide specific details on this point, it appears to suggest that 
some GMO-related activities would be subject to strict tort liability 
for damage caused by the activity, while other activities might be 
permitted defenses, relating, perhaps, to the social utility of the 
activities concerned.118 
The European Community’s proposed agricultural biotechnology 
regulations represent a much different, and apparently far more 
interventionist, approach to regulation of agricultural biotechnology 
than that adopted by the United States. It is too soon, for two reasons, 
to predict to what extent the tort liability system to be adopted for 
agricultural biotechnology in the EU will resemble that in the United 
States. First, the ultimate nature of the EU system is unclear. Second, 
as discussed below, the U.S. tort liability system is still in flux as far 
as agricultural biotechnology is concerned.  
VI. AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY REGULATORY FAILURES 
Despite the supposed comprehensiveness and quality of the 
Coordinated Framework, there were a series of regulatory failures 
involving agricultural biotechnology over the past several years. 
These failures raise questions about the quality and reliability of the 
U.S. agricultural biotechnology regulatory system. 
A. StarLink™ Case Study  
One genetically modified product that received attention both in 
the United States and abroad is StarLink™ corn, a type of corn 
genetically engineered to produce a pesticide to kill the European 
corn borer, a destructive pest.119 As explained before, pesticides, 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. § 4.2.2. 
 118. Id. §§ 4.2-4.3. 
 119. The European corn borer is “the most damaging insect pest of corn throughout the 
United States and Canada,” responsible for over $1 billion in crop losses and control costs each 
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including those substances inserted directly into the subject plant 
through genetic engineering which produce an insecticide within the 
plant, must be registered with EPA under FIFRA.120 
 
year. K.R. Ostlie et al., eds., Bt Corn & European Corn Borer: Long-Term Success Through 
Resistance Management (1997), available at http://www.extension.umn.edu/distribution/ 
cropsystems/DC7055.html#ch1 (last visited Jan. 3, 2002). To combat the pest, scientists have 
transferred genetic material from Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt), a naturally occurring soilborne 
microorganism, into food crops. The Bt gene produces crystal-like proteins (Cry proteins that 
are d-endotoxins) that kill specific groups of insects by binding to the intestinal lining of insects 
that eat the proteins, and rupturing intestinal cells. See id. 
 120. On May 5, 1995, the EPA granted the first registration for this type of “plant-
incorporated protectant” for the NewLeaf A3 potato, another form of Bt crop. See Abramson & 
Carrato, supra note 49, at 256. In registering the Bt protein for this use, the EPA found “that it 
was nontoxic to mammals, birds, and most other insects, and would reduce the need for 
conventional pesticides.” See id.  
 The review process for the NewLeaf A3 potato lasted five years, from 1991-1995, and 
included the following measures: 
The potato was initially field tested in small-scale plots under a permit granted by the 
USDA, followed by testing on a larger scale under an experimental use permit from 
the EPA. Subsequently, the USDA reviewed data submitted by the developer and 
determined that the modified potato was not a plant pest and, therefore, was not 
considered a regulated article under the plant pest regulations. The potato’s developer 
then completed the consultation process with the FDA, having submitted information 
confirming that, other than the presence of the B.t. protein, the NewLeafTM potato 
was not significantly different from any other Russet Burbank potato. These actions 
cleared the way for the review of health, safety, and environmental data and the 
eventual approval of applications for commercialization by the EPA. In addition to 
obtaining a registration of the B.t. protein as expressed in the potato under FIFRA, the 
applicant was also required to petition the EPA for a tolerance exemption for potential 
trace levels of the B.t. protein under the FFDCA.  
See id. According to Abramson and Carrato, “Technology companies have estimated that the 
combined cost to develop the (Bt) products, conduct the appropriate scientific studies, and 
obtain the necessary clearances for the current B.t. crops exceeded $3 billion.” See id. 
 The registrations for Bt crops are conditioned on the producers’ acceptance of specific 
conditions, and the EPA has in some cases “persuaded registrants to accept additional 
conditions years after the original product approval action.” See id. For example, the 
registrations for Bt corn and cotton were subject to an “ongoing reassessment” through the year 
2001, at which point the EPA had the option of whether to extend the registrations, or allow 
them to terminate. In October, 2001, the EPA extended the registrations for both Bt cotton and 
corn. For cotton, the EPA found the protein expressed in the genetically modified seeds, 
Cry1Ac, does not “significantly increase the risk of unreasonable adverse effects on the 
environment” and that use of Bt cotton would not pose risks to human health or to non-target 
species. See The EPA Biopesticides Registration Action Document, Bt Plant-Incorporated 
Protectants at IV 4 (Sept. 29, 2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/biopesticides/ 
otherdocs/bt_brad2/6%20cotton.pdf. However, because Cry1Ac raises concerns with respect to 
the risk of gene flow and insect resistance management, EPA conditioned the registration on 
specific terms and conditions. 
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StarLink™ corn was initially registered with the EPA in May 
1998.121 The registration was limited to animal feed or industrial use 
with a maximum 120,000 acres.122 The EPA did not approve the corn 
for human consumption based on concerns that a protein contained in 
StarLink™ corn, known as Cry9C, may be a human allergen.123 
However, the EPA approved the corn for animal consumption, based 
on the EPA’s determination that the effect of any residual Cry9C in 
animal products would not be harmful to humans.124 When 
StarLink™ was re-registered in 1999, 125 the restrictions limiting it to 
 
 The registration for Bt corn containing Cry1Ab or Cry1F proteins was also extended, 
subject to specific terms and conditions. See id. The EPA concluded that Cry1Ab and Cry1F, 
the proteins found in the corn products at issue, have significant economic benefits, result in 
“less human and environmental risk than chemical alternatives,” and would not pose risks to 
human health or to non-target species. See id.  
 121. EPA Office of Pesticide Programs, Biopesticide Fact Sheet: Bacillus thuringiensis 
subspecies tolworthi Cry9C Protein and the Genetic Material Necessary for Its Production in 
Corn, Section A (Mar. 2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/biopesticides/ 
factsheets/fs006466t.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2001). 
 122. See id. 
 123. The EPA was unable to determine that there was a “reasonable certainty of no harm” 
from use of StarLink™ corn in human food, because of the risk that Cry9C could be allergenic: 
The Agency’s assessment of Cry9C revealed that it has particular characteristics in 
common with known allergens: it is relatively heat stable and does not readily break 
down in simulated digestive fluids. This raises the possibility that it could be a human 
allergen. However, EPA determined that, notwithstanding its concern with respect to 
human ingestion of Cry9C, Cry9C was “safe” and when used as animal feed would not 
present unreasonable risks to human health. Because the protein does not transfer to 
meat and poultry products, use in animal feed would not result in human dietary 
exposure to the protein/potential allergen. 
Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4,825, 4,826 (Jan. 18, 2001).  
 124. The EPA stated: 
Based on the toxicology data cited and the limited exposure expected with animal feed 
use, there is reasonable certainty that no harm will result from aggregate exposure to 
the U.S. population, including infants and children, to residues of . . . Cry9C protein 
and the genetic material necessary for its production in corn. This includes all 
anticipated dietary exposures and all other exposures for which there is reliable 
information. The Agency has arrived at this conclusion because, as discussed above, 
the temporary tolerance exemption is limited to feed use only. 
Bacillus Thuringiensis Subspecies Tolworthi Cry9C Protein and Genetic Material Necessary for 
Production in Corn, 63 Fed. Reg. 28,260 (May 22, 1998) (emphasis added). 
 125. The registration was transferred to AgrEvo USA Company, and then to Aventis Crop 
Science USA LP. “On October 29, 1998, the StarLinkTM corn registration was conveyed from 
Plant Genetic Systems (America) to AgrEvo USA. AgrEvo USA and Rhone Poulenc Ag 
Company subsequently formed Aventis CropScience USA LP (Aventis). As of February 22, 
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domestic animal and industrial use only and the 660 foot buffer zone 
remained the same, but the total allowable acreage was increased to 
2.5 million acres.126 The registration, which expired May 30, 2000, 
imposed a condition requiring the then registrant, Aventis, to ensure 
that all growers signed an agreement to abide by the restrictions set 
forth in the registration.127  
The EPA registration outlined precise language that was to be 
used in the directions accompanying the product.128 It appears that, at 
some time, Aventis prepared a form, entitled “StarLink Bt Grower 
Agreement,” that listed restrictions on the use of StarLink corn, but 
 
2000, the StarLinkTM corn registration is now held by Aventis under registration number 264-
669.” See Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4825 (Jan. 18, 
2001). 
 126. See EPA Office of Pesticide Programs, supra note 122, at Section B. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See Neil E. Harl et al., The StarLink™ Situation, at 2-4 (July 30, 2001), available at 
http://www.exnet.iastate.edu/Pages/grain/publications/buspub/0100star.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 
2002) (emphasis added): 
DIRECTIONS FOR USE 
 It is a violation of Federal Law to use this product in a manner inconsistent with its 
labeling. Keep out of lakes, ponds or streams. Do not contaminate water by cleaning of 
equipment or disposal of wastes. All field corn containing the plant-pesticide that is 
sold or distributed by Aventis CropScience USA LP or a cooperator or licensee of 
Aventis, must be accompanied by informational material that contains the following: 
 * * * 
 * * * 
 Feed or Non-food Industrial Uses: Seeds expressing the Cry9C protein should be 
planted at a maximum of 40,000 seeds per acre on the site. Any seeds, plants or plant 
materials in the StarLink™ field, or within 660 feet of the field, should be used 
domestically for animal feed or non-food industrial purposes. None of the seeds, plants 
or plant materials in the StarLink™ plot, or within 660 feet of the field, may be used 
for food uses or may enter international commerce. 
 * * * 
STORAGE AND DISPOSAL 
 Seed Storage: Store in a cool dry place separate from conventional corn seed. 
Seed and Plant Disposal: Any seeds, plants or plant materials in the StarLink field, 
or within 660 feet of the field, may be used domestically for animal feed or industrial 
purposes, or destroyed. None of the seeds, plants or plant materials in the 
StarLink field, or within 660 feet of the field, may be used for food uses or may enter 
international commerce . . . .  
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“not all producers were asked to or did sign the agreement.”129 It is 
not clear whether growers actually received the warning required by 
EPA as a condition of registration.130 However, it is undeniable that, 
even if growers were adequately warned, StarLink corn did enter 
the human consumption food channels. This entry caused a 
significant disruption in the corn market, and some consumers 
alleged resulting personal injury. 
The presence of StarLink corn in human food was initially 
discovered in September, 2000 by the environmental group Friends 
of the Earth.131 The group hired an independent laboratory to test 
Kraft taco shells, which were found to contain traces of StarLink™ 
corn.132 Immediately after the release of the test results, the FDA 
 
 129. The agreement states in part:  
In accepting StarLink corn, Grower agrees to direct the harvested grain and grain 
grown within 660 feet of the StarLink grain towards domestic feed (e.g. animal feed) 
and/or non-food industrial purposes. Grower agrees not to use this grain for food use 
or allow it to enter grain export channels. Grower further agrees to either feed the 
grain obtained from StarLink corn hybrids on-farm or sell it for domestic (animal) 
feed, industrial or non-food uses only. Possible domestic off-farm use of the grain 
includes selling it to feed mills, neighbors with livestock operations or elevators that 
supply U.S. livestock feed operations. Aventis CropScience will provide Grower with 
a list of elevators or grain buyers that can provide this type of usage, prior to planting 
and/or prior to harvest.  
See id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
 130. As one author observed:  
Essentially, Aventis depended on a game of telephone to keep StarLink from getting 
misdirected into the human components of the agricultural machine.  
For the plan to work, information about StarLink would be passed from Aventis to the 
seed companies; then the seed companies would communicate it to its dealers, who 
would in turn tell farmers who bought StarLink.  
Sometimes, the message got through. Jeff Lacina, a spokesman for the Garst Seed Co., 
said it informed all 3,500 of its dealers about the rules governing StarLink. And 
Sharon Greif, a Garst dealer in Linn County, Iowa, said she received that information 
and would have passed it to any customers who purchased the seed.  
But in many other cases, the message about StarLink did not get through. 
See The Associated Press, StarLink corn: How it reached the food supply (Dec. 4, 2000), 
available at http://archive.showmenews.com/2000/dec/20001204busi011.asp. 
 131. See National Environmental Trust, Genetically Engineered Corn Not Approved for 
Human consumption Found in Taco bell Brand Taco Shells [sic] (Sept. 18, 2000), at 
http://www.biotech-info.net/taco_bell.html.  
 132. See id. 
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began receiving reports from consumers alleging that they 
experienced adverse effects after consuming food containing 
StarLink corn.133 Kraft Foods began a “voluntary” recall and, at the 
request of the FDA, other companies recalled corn products that were 
suspected or known to contain StarLink.134 
On September 29, 2000, after consulting with the USDA, the 
EPA, and the FDA, Aventis agreed to purchase that year’s crop of 
StarLink™ corn, which prevented the majority of the 2000 crop from 
being used in processed foods.135 In addition to the “voluntary” buy-
back program, in January of 2001, Aventis “voluntarily” signed an 
agreement, with seventeen state attorney generals, legally binding the 
company for four years to compensate not only farmers who grew 
StarLink™ corn, but also farmers who did not grow StarLink™ corn 
but whose corn was found to contain the Cry9C protein.136  
The EPA confirmed that StarLinkTM corn entered the human food 
supply.137 It is unclear exactly how much of the corn is presently in 
the U.S. food supply, although current estimates are lower than 
previous ones.138 The risk of new StarLinkTM corn entering the food 
 
 133. See Ctr. for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, FDA Evaluation of Consumer 
Complaints Linked to Foods Allegedly Containing StarLink™ Corn, at 2 (June 13, 2001). From 
July 25, 2000 to April 20, 2001, the FDA received a total of sixty-three consumer complaints. 
See id. at 3. 
 134. See EPA Office of Pesticide Program, supra note 122, at Section C. 
 135. See id. The USDA’s Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) would purchase from 
farmers any StarLink™ corn that they did not plan to use as animal feed, at a rate of $0.25 per 
bushel over the CCC’s posted price for the relevant county, and Aventis would reimburse the 
CCC. Alternatively, farmers electing to use the corn as feed on their farms would be paid a 
premium of $0.25 per bushel. 
 136. K.T. Arasu, U.S. States Ink StarLink Bio-corn Pact with Aventis (Jan. 23, 2001), at 
http://www.extension.iastate.edu/Pages/grain/news/starlink/starlink_jan/usstatesink.html (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2002).  
 137. The EPA stated: 
Test data from several sources demonstrate that StarLinkTM corn was diverted into 
human food. Data from Aventis, Kraft Corporation, and the Food and Drug 
Administration confirmed the presence of Aventis’ Cry9c DNA (the genetic material 
necessary for the production of Cry9C) in Taco Bell taco shells when tested. . . .  
Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4,825 (Jan. 18, 2001).  
 138. An EPA Scientific Advisory Panel estimated that the amount of StarLink corn 
currently in the food supply is lower than the EPA previously thought: 
The revised Aventis dietary exposure assessment report assumes that 0.125% of corn 
in all corn-based foods, including those produced from white corn, is StarLink™ grain 
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supply also appears to be low.139 To prevent the further inundation of 
 
. . . According to testimony by the North American Millers Association at the July, 
2001 SAP meeting, only 1.2% of 85,000 truckloads of corn received by dry millers 
was found to test positive for StarLink™. There appears to be a high rate of 
compliance with recommendations for testing incoming grain in the food corn 
processing industry . . . . Loads of corn in which Cry9C protein is detected are likely to 
be rejected. For these reasons, the SAP believes that the assumption of 0.125% 
StarLink™ corn in the food supply is highly conservative. 
 * * * 
 Assuming a consistent program of testing grain entering food processing plants and 
reductions of Cry9C protein due to processing . . . the Panel concluded that the levels 
of Cry9C protein entering the U.S. food corn supply are very low. EPA estimated 
current concentrations of Cry9C protein in food corn to be 0.34 ppb, using the Aventis 
estimate of 5% rejection rate at corn dry mills. . . . Based on the North American 
Millers Association (NAMA) industry data showing 1.2% rejection rate, the 
concentration in food corn samples could be as low as 0.1 ppb. Additionally, the 
concentrations of Cry9C protein in both general grain stocks and the [U.S.] food corn 
supply will decline rapidly after the 2001 crop is harvested and with each subsequent 
production year.  
See FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP), A Set of Scientific Issues Being Considered by the 
Environmental Protection Agency Regarding: Assessment of Additional Scientific Information 
Concerning StarLink™ Corn, SAP Rep. No. 2001-09, at 19-22 (July 25, 2001) [hereinafter 
FIFRA SAP Report]. 
 139. Furthermore, the SAP estimates that the risk of new StarLink corn entering the food 
supply is “very small”: 
The risk of new Cry9C corn entering the food corn supply from the 2001 and later 
harvests has been managed. The original estimate of EPA in the December 2000 SAP 
report (that U.S. corn stocks contain 0.4% uncontrolled StarLinkTM) now appears to 
be overstated, especially for corn offered for use in the food market. In fact, the Panel 
concludes that even Aventis’ estimate of 0.125% StarLinkTM corn in loads delivered 
to food corn processors may be too high. The Panel believes that as long as direct food 
corn users (dry millers, masa processors) continue to rigorously test to the lowest 
available detection limits, there will be a very small and decreasing risk of producing 
corn based foods with detectable Cry9C protein. 
Id. at 25-26. However, as noted, this estimate depends on continued vigilance by market actors, 
and will not be controlled by direct regulatory measures. 
One observer has noted that there is an alternative method of regulating StarLink™:  
There is another regulatory option available to Aventis, besides a tolerance exemption 
from EPA, that would allow commerce to proceed. Aventis could ask FDA to regulate 
low levels of Cry9C toxin in food as an unavoidable adulterant—a step that would not 
jeopardize the integrity of the EPA’s regulatory system for genetically engineered 
products.  
See Testimony of Rebecca Goldburg, PhD, to EPA’s FIFRA Science Advisory Panel, 
Comments Regarding the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) Assessment of 
Scientific Information Concerning Starlink Corn Cry9C Plant-Pesticide (Nov. 28, 2000), at       
                                        
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p245 Van Cleve book pages.doc  12/18/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
284 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 9:245 
 
the U.S. corn crop with hybrids containing Cry9C protein, the USDA, 
through the CCC, offered to purchase non-StarLinkTM brands of 
hybrid corn seed containing Cry9C.140  
The negative effects of the StarLinkTM event are far-reaching, with 
the total cost to date estimated at approximately $1 billion.141 The 
corn market experienced significant disruption, including the cost of 
testing for the presence of commingled StarLink™ corn, the cost of 
rerouting corn shipments rejected by processors because StarLink™ 
is detected, and the cost and effort of devising methods to segregate 
corn to avoid commingling.142 These costs will continue to accrue as 
long as StarLink™ corn is present in the food supply. 
In fact, cross-pollination may have affected the crops of farmers 
who did not plant StarLink™ corn, causing the controversial Cry9 
protein to be found in their crops. Groups of such farmers filed class 
action suits against Aventis in Iowa and Illinois.143 
In addition to the effect on the domestic market, the United States 
experienced a significant drop in its corn exports in late 2000 and 
early 2001 as foreign markets expressed concern over genetically 
modified corn.144 The Japanese discovered StarLink corn in snacks 
and animal feed, leading the U.S. Department of Agriculture to 
negotiate an agreement with Japan to screen U.S. corn shipments.145  
 
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/programs/Health/StarLinkCom.html (last visited Jan. 2, 
2002). 
 140. See EPA Office of Pesticide Programs, supra note 122, at Section C.  
 141. See David Barboza, As Biotech Crops Multiply, Consumers Get Little Choice, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 10, 2001, at A1. “Seed companies, farmers, processors and food makers have spent 
more than $1 billion in the last six months trying to eradicate Starlink. But most experts agree 
that will take years.” Id. It is not clear that this figure accounts for the impact on U.S. corn 
exports, discussed infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text. 
 142. William Lin et al., Impacts on the U.S. Corn Market and World Trade, in USDA’S 
FEED YEARBOOK 40-48 (2001), available at http://www.biotech-info.net/corn_impacts.html 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2001).  
 143. Anthony Shadid, Blown Profits: Genetic Drift Affects More Than Biology—U.S. 
Farmers Stand to Lose Millions, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 8, 2001, at G1, available at 2001 WL 
3928228. 
 144. The largest factor in declining exports was restrictions imposed on the use of 
Starlink™ corn in major U.S. export markets, particularly Japan and South Korea. See Lin et 
al., supra note 142. Between November 2000 and February 2001, Japan’s imports of U.S. corn 
for starch manufacturing declined twenty-seven percent from the previous year, and Japan 
turned to countries such as South Africa and Brazil to supply its corn. See id.  
 145. See Philip Brasher, Biotech Corn Hurting U.S. Exports, Associated Press Online, Nov. 
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Despite the public concern over StarLink corn, it is uncertain 
whether the product actually poses a threat to human health. A report 
issued by a Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP) to the EPA on July 25, 
2001 concluded: 
The test [that FDA developed to determine whether individuals 
had experienced an allergic reaction], as conducted, does not 
eliminate StarLink™ Cry9C protein as a potential cause of 
allergic symptoms. The negative results decrease the 
probability that the Cry9C protein is the cause of allergic 
symptoms in the individuals examined. 
* * * 
[The test used by the FDA] does not eliminate the possibility 
that the individuals . . . reacted to the StarLink™ corn.  
Additional studies are necessary to eliminate Cry9C proteins 
as a potential cause for the allergic symptoms reported.146 
Consumers who claimed to have adverse reactions to products 
containing StarLink corn filed a class action suit in the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, but the court 
preliminarily approved a proposed settlement on November 29, 
2001.147 
Aventis “voluntarily” withdrew the product registration for 
StarLink in January, 2001. In accepting the cancellation, the EPA 
noted that: 
[T]his cancellation is being proposed because Aventis has 
failed to ensure that StarLink™ corn will not be diverted to 
human food, [sic] it is incumbent on any proponent of further 
use to demonstrate either: (1) That further use will not be 
diverted to human food, or (2) that StarLinkTM corn is safe for 
 
17, 2000, available at http://www.connectotel.com/gmfood/ap171100.txt (last visited Jan. 23, 
2002). 
 146. See FIFRA SAP Report, supra note 138, at 29-30. 
 147. See The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois’ findings of November 
29, 2001, available at http://www.starlinkcorn.com/ConsumerClassAction Settlement/Findings 
.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2002). 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p245 Van Cleve book pages.doc  12/18/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
286 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 9:245 
 
human consumption because it will not present an 
unreasonable allergenic risk.148 
Currently, according to Aventis, StarLink corn has not been 
commercialized in any country other than the United States.149  
It is not clear what standard the EPA will apply in determining 
whether Aventis sufficiently established that StarLink does not 
present an unreasonable risk. It is not clear whether the company 
must prove with one hundred percent certainty that there is no risk of 
an allergic reaction in humans or if some lesser standard should 
apply. Moreover, it is unclear whether the EPA should hold Aventis 
financially responsible for any injuries sustained in the event of an 
allergic reaction. Several aspects of the Starlink story constitute 
regulatory failures on the part of the federal government, particularly 
the EPA.150  
First, the EPA’s labeling requirements for Starlink™ corn seed, 
described above, ignored the realities of the agricultural growing and 
crop collection and distribution system. This system could not 
 
 148. Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4,825 (Jan. 18, 
2001).  
 149. Aventis states: 
This technology is not currently being developed or commercialized anywhere in the 
world, including the USA. Furthermore, Aventis CropScience has committed that the 
Cry9C technology will not be commercialized unless and until the necessary scientific 
methodology is developed to demonstrate to the EPA that, indeed, Cry9C may be 
safely registered for any end use. 
Aventis CropScience is continuing its efforts to identify, contain and redirect corn 
containing Cry9C protein to animal feed and non-food, industrial uses in the US. 
These uses are fully authorized by the US Environmental Protection Agency. 
Aventis, Current Status of StarLink Corn, available at http://www.starlinkcorn.com/ 
Current%20Status/Current%20Status.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2002). In light of the voluntary 
withdrawal of the StarLink™ registration, the EPA will not consider extension of the original 
registration. See The EPA Biopesticides Registration Action Document, supra note 120, at 11, 
available at http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/biopesticides/otherdocs/bt_brad2/1%20overview. 
pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2002). 
 150. To hold the EPA entirely responsible, though, would be to ignore what might be 
described as an inherent flaw of the Coordinated Framework and the “blinders on” approach 
taken by the federal agencies to regulation in this area: neither USDA, which regulates 
agriculture, nor FDA, which regulates food safety, seem to have played any meaningful part in 
reviewing the EPA’s proposed efforts at the time of registration to control the distribution of 
Starlink™ corn products, despite the fact that in all likelihood the EPA knew less about the 
issues involved in meaningful regulation on this issue than they did. 
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realistically provide the segregation on which the EPA sought to 
insist, at least without substantial additional enforcement and 
administrative requirements. EPA’s labeling requirements were 
therefore essentially “paper” requirements.151  
Second, based on a review of the public record described above, 
none of the parties involved: Aventis; seed dealers; seed buyers; 
growers; crop collectors such as silos; or grain handling companies 
seem to have been sanctioned for failure to observe or impose the 
EPA labeling restrictions. The government’s failure to impose 
sanctions, beyond Aventis’ agreement to absorb various costs for 
predictable failures to observe restrictions imposed by its registration 
requirements, was tantamount to an admission that the requirements 
were unenforceable at the outset. 
Third, the EPA failed to use its authority in permitting the use of 
Starlink™ seed to establish which parties within the agricultural 
production and distribution system were required to accept 
responsibility for failure to observe and/or enforce its regulatory 
restrictions. Although the EPA required Aventis to engage in labeling 
and to obligate contractually others to observe the labeling 
restrictions, this situation effectively permitted Aventis to disclaim 
liability for failures to observe the labeling restrictions and did not 
force observance of the restrictions. Given the structure of the 
agricultural production and distribution system in the United States, it 
is entirely possible that had the EPA insisted on establishing clear 
responsibility throughout the agricultural production and distribution 
system for failures to observe restrictions, and to require monitoring 
and enforcement of such responsibilities before permitting the use of 
Starlink™ seed, the marketplace would not have been willing to 
accept the use of the seed because of increased administrative costs 
and liability risks.152  
 
 151. It is one thing to rely on this “paper” enforcement structure of labeling and contracts 
in the control of agricultural chemicals, which are likely to cause only localized damage if 
misused. It is quite another to employ the same system in the case of products that may enter 
the food supply that can actually cause demonstrable damage to other crops miles away from 
their site of use, or even possibly hundreds or thousands of miles away. See NRC Report, supra 
note 1, at 91; see also Mexican maize, infra notes 153-59 and accompanying text. 
 152. This result appears to be precisely what happened to another potential Aventis product 
for soybeans, Libertylink™, which was reportedly “voluntarily” withdrawn from the market—
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Fourth, it should be a source of embarrassment to the EPA that an 
environmental group, rather than the EPA or Aventis, actually 
discovered the contamination of the food supply that resulted from 
the unlawful distribution in commerce of Starlink™ corn. If the EPA 
is going to establish a set of restrictions on the use of an agricultural 
biotechnology product, it has a responsibility to the public to make 
certain that those restrictions are being observed. There is no 
substantial evidence that the EPA met this responsibility here. 
These regulatory failures with respect to Starlink™ corn were 
avoidable. The federal government had sufficient legal authority to 
design and impose more effective regulations for the control of 
Starlink™ corn. Effective regulations would have been able to 
achieve better results and perhaps to avoid large unnecessary costs 
for Aventis. These regulatory failures do not, alone, call into question 
either the utility of agricultural biotechnology or the safety of 
Starlink™ corn. It is unreasonable, nevertheless, to expect that the 
public will accept inadequate regulations like those imposed in the 
case of Starlink™ corn as a basis for public acceptance of agricultural 
biotechnology, particularly where food products are concerned.  
B. The “Surprising” Case of Mexican Maize Contaminated with 
Genetically Engineered Corn Genes 
On October 2, 2001, the New York Times reported that maize 
growing in fifteen different locations in Mexico contained genetically 
engineered genes.153 The research leading to the discoveries was 
 
at the urging of trade groups representing crop producers—because the soybeans had not 
received import clearance in overseas markets. See American Soybean Association New, ASA 
Lands AgrEvo Decision to Protect U.S. Export Markets by Delaying Commercialization of 
LibertyLink® Soybeans (Mar. 10, 1999), available at http://www.asa-hamburg_de/gen_n6.html. 
 153. Carol K. Yoon, Genetic Modification Taints Corn in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 
2001, at F7. 
According to the report: 
In a finding that has taken researchers by surprise and alarmed environmentalists, the 
Mexican government has discovered that some of the country’s native corn varieties 
have been contaminated with genetically engineered DNA. The contaminated seeds 
were collected from a region considered to be the world’s center of diversity for 
corn—exactly the kind of repository of genetic variation that environmentalists and 
many scientists had hoped to protect from contamination. The result was unexpected 
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conducted by researchers from the United States and the Mexican 
 
because genetically modified corn, the presumed source of the foreign genes, has not 
been approved for commercial planting in Mexico. 
Scientists expressed concern that the foreign genes could act to reduce genetic 
diversity in the country’s native corn varieties and in the wild progenitor of 
domesticated corn, known as teosinte. If any of the foreign genes are very 
advantageous, plants carrying those genes could begin to dominate the population. In 
such cases genetic variation will be lost as the diversity of plants not carrying the 
foreign genes decreases or disappears. Whether that will happen or has happened 
remains unknown. 
In addition to being one of the world’s most important crops, corn is viewed with a 
near religious reverence in Mexico, with seeds of native varieties passed down from 
generation to generation. Until now, scientists said researchers had assumed that these 
varieties, some of which are grown only by subsistence farmers in remote areas, were 
pristine. 
“These are the extremes, the places where you would really not expect to find 
contamination,” said Dr. Ignacio Chapela, a microbial ecologist at the University of 
California at Berkeley, saying the results are an indication of widespread 
contamination. “The only reason they found it there is because that’s the only place 
they’ve looked.” 
Scientists said the results also indicated that crop genes might be able to spread across 
geographic areas and varieties more quickly than researchers had guessed. 
“It shows in today’s modern world how rapidly genetic material can move from one 
place to another,” said Dr. Norman C. Ellstrand, evolutionary biologist at University of 
California at Riverside. He said the real worry was that other foreign genes—like 
pharmaceutical-producing genes being developed in crops—could also find their way 
quickly and unnoticed into distant food sources. Mexico’s Ministry of the 
Environment and Natural Resources made the announcement on Sept. 18 that 
contaminated corn had been found in 15 different localities. The announcement 
credited Dr. Chapela with the initial discovery but described only the results from 
government-led research. Neither Dr. Chapela’ s team nor the Mexican teams’ work 
has yet been published. 
Scientists assume the native corn became contaminated through interbreeding with Bt 
corn, but how Bt corn may have come to be planted in Mexico remains a matter of 
speculation. While not approved for planting, biotech corn is legally imported into 
Mexico for use in food. The Mexican government has not disclosed exactly what 
genes were found. 
Exequiel Ezcurra, the director of the National Institute of Ecology, which worked on 
the study, did not respond to requests for an interview. But Dr. Chapela, who is 
familiar with the Mexican work, said the researchers had identified the presence of 
DNA sequences from the cauliflower mosaic virus. This DNA is used nearly 
universally in genetically engineered plants and does not produce Bt insecticide. As a 
result, it is still unclear whether any of the contaminated corn has the ability to produce 
the Bt insecticide. 
Id. 
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government.154 Mexican maize was thought to be a relatively pure 
strain of corn that was grown using conventional techniques in 
Mexico for thousands of years.155 Virtually all of the permitting 
regulatory risk analysis for the use of Bt corn assumes that the pollen 
generated by that corn, containing Bt-produced endotoxins as well as 
the ability to reproduce such Bt corn, will travel only a few hundred 
feet from the plants.156 It was regarded as “surprising” that 
genetically engineered corn genes would be found in maize growing 
in Mexico only five years after the planting of such corn was first 
permitted in the United States.157  
The point of the Mexican maize mystery is not that it necessarily 
indicates that any particularly harmful result occurred.158 What is at 
stake instead is a regulatory quality issue. If the genetic 
contamination occurred through planting, the lesson to be drawn is 
that genetically modified corn should not be planted in Mexico. If 
such planting occurred in a number of different locations, this result 
indicates a lack of necessary controls on either the part of the U.S. 
government, the Mexican government, or both. Alternatively, the 
genetic contamination occurred as a result of pollen spread from U.S. 
planted crops, this result would suggest that current regulatory 
assumptions about pollen travel and transfer may be seriously 
mistaken. In either event, it is incumbent upon U.S. regulators to 
determine conclusively the source of the genetically engineered 
material, which is very likely of U.S. origin. This determination will 
 
 154. Id. More recent news reports indicate that there is a question about the accuracy of the 
original test data demonstrating genetic contamination of Mexican maize. On April 5, 2002, the 
New York Times reported that the scientific journal Nature had stated that based on its further 
review of criticisms of the original data, the “evidence available is not sufficient to justify 
publication of the original paper” that reported the contamination results. Carol K. Yoon, 
Journal Raises Doubts on Biotech Study, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2002, at A19. The New York 
Times continued, however: “The conclusion of contamination [in Mexican maize] has largely 
remained unchallenged. Instead, scientists have focused their criticism on data suggesting that 
genetically engineered DNA might behave in unexpected ways, scattering around the 
genome . . .” Id. 
 155. Id.  
 156. Id.  
 157. Id.  
 158. However, an invasion of an ecosystem by an exotic should always be of management 
concern because ecosystems often lack defenses against exotics, and so can be destroyed by 
them. 
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make it possible to impose better controls or to improve regulatory 
assumptions made in permitting genetically altered products to be 
made and sold. Information regarding the origin of genetically 
engineered material in crops grown in other countries is information 
the U.S. regulatory system should have already obtained through the 
permitting, monitoring, and enforcement process. Its failure to obtain 
such information is a form of regulatory failure.159 The U.S. 
regulatory system and U.S. agriculture, including agricultural 
exporters, can ill afford to be “surprised” in this manner if they are to 
achieve public acceptance for their products. As a matter of U.S. 
foreign policy, the United States can ill afford the loss of 
international credibility resulting from such surprises, and U.S. 
taxpayers should not be expected to bear any of the resulting costs or 
damages. 
C. Lessons from the Transgenic Salmon Case Study 
Salmon are unusual fish. Salmon have an unusual life history that 
adapted them well to the demands of several rigorous environments. 
This exceptional adaptation to particularly harsh environments 
suggests that the genetic makeup of salmon is distinctive but, 
unfortunately, it is not well understood.160 Salmon populations are in 
decline in most of the lower forty-eight United States because of a 
 
 159. In the same vein, the NRC Report sharply criticized the fact that federal regulators do 
not have accurate information about the impact of Bt corn on nontarget organisms. The NRC 
Report stated:  
Given that Bt corn is already planted over millions of acres in the United States, it 
seems appropriate for EPA, USDA, or registrants to sponsor careful field tests to 
determine whether lacewings or other natural enemies of crop pests are adversely 
affected by Bt corn.  
NRC Report, supra note 1, at 113. The NRC Report therefore recommended that the “EPA 
should provide guidelines for determining the most ecologically relevant test organisms and test 
procedures for assessing nontarget effects in specific cropping systems.” Id. 
 160. The uncertainty regarding salmon biology is evident in the resources expended by the 
federal government to study the conditions necessary for salmon survival. See, e.g., Statement 
of Jamie Rappaport Clark, Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior, 
Before the Subcommittee on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans of the House 
Resources Committee, Regarding the Agency’s Fiscal Year 2001 Budget Request (Mar. 23, 
2000), available at http://laws.fws.gov/testimon/2000test/budgetma.htm. 
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combination of habitat and demand pressure.161 Recently, the federal 
government declared certain salmon populations to be either 
threatened or endangered species.162 
The federal government has not yet agreed to permit the release of 
genetically modified or “transgenic” salmon into the environment.163 
However, it is well known that such transgenic salmon are under 
development, and it probably will be necessary for the government to 
grant a permit for their release into the environment.164 In anticipation 
of such a request, federal government agencies responsible for such 
permitting undertook a case study to analyze the issues that would be 
presented by a request to permit such transgenic salmon farming.165 
Ironically, this case study discloses that the government’s efforts to 
regulate existing conventional salmon fish farming, when it approved 
permits for such farming, constitute a form of regulatory failure. 
Unless the government fully addresses the failure of the regulatory 
process, unfortunate and potentially irreversible results are likely to 
occur. 
1. Conventional Salmon Fish Farming 
Conventional salmon fish farming is a substantial and growing 
industry. In salmon fish farming, salmon are first bred in a manner 
intended to make them sterile, and then confined in pens in the ocean 
during the growing cycle.166 The purpose of sterile breeding is to 
avoid interbreeding with other salmon populations, including wild 
 
 161. See, e.g., National Wildlife Federation, Case Study: Salmon, available at 
www.nwf.org/population/Salmon.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2002) (noting that commercial 
fishing and habitat degradation have contributed to the decline of wild salmon populations). 
 162. See Case Studies, supra note 35, Case Study One, at 1; Deskbook, supra note 35, at 
113. 
 163. See Case Studies, supra note 35, Case Study One, at 1-2; Deskbook, supra note 35, at 
113-14. 
 164. See Case Study, supra note 35, Case Study One, at 30; Deskbook, supra note 35, at 
142. The regulatory structure for this permitting is different than that described above for plant 
products, and will involve additional federal agencies, including the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers and the Department of the Interior. Case Studies, supra note 35, Case Study One, at 
1; Deskbook, supra note 35, at 113. 
 165. See Case Studies, supra note 35, at Case Study One, at 1; Deskbook, supra note 35, at 
113. 
 166. See Case Studies, supra note 35, at Case Study One, at 4; Deskbook, supra note 35, at 
116. 
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salmon, in the event of an escape from the pens.167 The purpose of 
confinement in pens is to permit the fish to be easily recaptured at the 
end of the growing cycle when they are to be harvested, but this 
confinement also has the effect of limiting interbreeding.168 The 
federal agencies that permit fish farming to occur assumed that sterile 
breeding would be successful, and that even in those cases where 
sterile breeding was not successful, escape from pens would not 
occur.169 In the event that escape of a nonsterile fish did occur, it was 
assumed that the nonsterile fish would be unlikely to survive and 
interbreed due to environmental factors, including predation and 
geographic separation.170 In short, the regulatory agencies took 
comfort from the idea that there were multiple barriers to the 
interbreeding of farmed and wild species of salmon. 
The federal agency case study on transgenic salmon discloses that 
each of the assumptions that supported the idea that the salmon fish 
farms could indeed prevent farmed and wild salmon species 
interbreeding were to some extent contrary to reality. First, the 
techniques used to ensure sterility of the farmed salmon are not one 
hundred percent reliable.171 Second, fish escape from salmon pens 
with reasonable frequency because the ocean is a harsh environment 
and pens are not an especially robust containment system for 
economic reasons.172 Third, the escaped fish survive outside the pens 
and reproduce with reasonable frequency.173 In other words, not one 
of the “containment system” assumptions made by federal regulatory 
authorities proved wholly accurate when judged against real world 
experience. Nor is this situation the first time that authorities 
 
 167. See Case Studies, supra note 35, at Case Study One, at 4; Deskbook, supra note 35, at 
116. 
 168. See generally Case Studies, supra note 35, at Case Study One, at 5; Deskbook, supra 
note 35, at 117. 
 169. See Case Studies, supra note 35, at Case Study One, at 6; Deskbook, supra note 35, at 
118. 
 170. See Case Studies, supra note 35, at Case Study One, at 6; Deskbook, supra note 35, at 
118. 
 171. See Case Studies, supra note 35, at Case Study One, at 4; Deskbook, supra note 35, at 
116. 
 172. See Case Studies, supra note 35, at Case Study One, at 23; Deskbook, supra note 35, 
at 135. 
 173. See Case Studies, supra note 35, at Case Study One, at 5; Deskbook, supra note 35, at 
117. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p245 Van Cleve book pages.doc  12/18/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
294 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 9:245 
 
underestimated the ability of salmon as a species to survive. As the 
federal agency study acknowledges, because it was assumed that 
salmon would not survive in fresh water, more than 20,000 salmon 
fry were flushed into the Great Lakes in the early 1970s.174 The result 
was an explosion of the population of salmon in the Great Lakes.175 
The containment steps required by existing conventional salmon 
fish farming permittees will slow down, but will not eliminate, the 
transfer of genetic material between the farmed and wild salmon 
species. This result would not be significant if the wild and farmed 
species were essentially equivalent, so that genetic transfer between 
them was of no consequence. No one knows, however, whether this 
conclusion is reasonable. In fact, there is reason to believe, based on 
the quality of the adaptation made by the wild salmon to their 
environment, that they contain valuable genetic material that could 
prove very useful if isolated and properly understood. If the wild 
species is extinguished by interbreeding with farmed salmon, this 
genetic material may be irretrievably lost. 
2. Transgenic Salmon Permitting 
The transgenic salmon under development are apparently prized 
by their developers because they can grow substantially faster than 
conventional salmon as a result of added genetic material, thus 
cutting the cost of production by shortening the time to market.176 
Many of the same issues raised by the government’s failure to 
properly regulate conventional salmon fish farming are raised by 
transgenic salmon farming. 
Transgenic salmon permitting poses an additional risk. Transgenic 
salmon grow more quickly and may be better competitors for food 
supply, and thus may prove more successful in mating. In other 
words, if the transgenic salmon escape confinement, and can breed, 
they may decrease genetic variation when interbreeding with the wild 
 
 174. See Case Studies, supra note 35, at Case Study One, at 8; Deskbook, supra note 35, at 
120. 
 175. See Case Studies, supra note 35, at Case Study One, at 8; Deskbook, supra note 35, at 
120. 
 176. See Case Studies, supra note 35, at Case Study One, at 1; Deskbook, supra note 35, at 
113. 
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population.177 Over time, the result would be a decline of the total 
population of wild-type salmon. 
Thus, the past experience of the federal government with permits 
for conventional salmon fish farming shows that it is necessary to 
substantially improve its permitting process in the case of transgenic 
salmon. The result of regulatory failure in that respect might be the 
irreversible collapse of wild salmon populations, despite their status 
as threatened or endangered species. 
3. Lessons from the Inadequacy of the Coordinated Framework 
with Respect to Pest-Protected Plants 
In view of the prominence of pest-protected plants in agricultural 
biotechnology today, it is striking to note that such plants were not 
regulated by the Coordinated Framework.178 The EPA’s failure to 
promulgate scientifically justifiable final regulations to govern pest-
protected plants until after it granted permits allowing the planting of 
millions of acres of such plants is, in itself, a significant form of 
regulatory failure.  
Although the NRC Report on pest-protected plants can be fairly 
described as supportive of the use of agricultural biotechnology, 
careful reading discloses that it is also sharply critical of the quality 
of regulation that occurred to date. First, the NRC Report criticized 
the scientific basis of major exemptions from plant-pesticide 
regulation proposed by the EPA. Second, the NRC Report concluded 
that “[t]he scope of product reviews, as delineated by USDA and 
EPA, has the potential to result in gaps in regulatory coverage.”179 In 
particular, the NRC Report noted that the USDA regulates only 
 
 177. See Case Studies, supra note 35, at Case Study One, at 23; Deskbook, supra note 35, 
at 135. 
 178. NRC Report, supra note 1, at 145: 
What the framework left unresolved were jurisdictional issues that would have to be 
addressed before commercial introduction of a number of products, including 
transgenic plants that were modified to resist disease and ward off insect pests. In fact, 
plants modified to exhibit pesticidal traits were not specifically addressed by the 
coordinated framework. 
 179. Id. at 161. 
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GMOs that it thinks are produced using “plant pests.”180 As the NRC 
Report noted, “[m]any plants do not automatically meet the definition 
of a ‘plant pest.’”181 In other words, according to the NRC, the 
development of new techniques for genetically engineering crops 
means that “the scope of USDA’s regulations might now fail to 
encompass some genetically engineered crops that the agency wishes 
to regulate.”182  
Third, the NRC Report notes that in the case of regulating Bt 
cotton, the EPA and the USDA reached significantly different 
conclusions on whether any regulation at all should be required.183 
The USDA concluded that such cotton could be permitted without 
restrictions, because of the USDA’s narrow regulatory focus limited 
to plant pests.184 The EPA, on the other hand, placed “geographic 
restrictions on the planting of Bt cotton until additional information 
could be provided to adequately assess the potential for and 
consequences of transfer of the Bt gene to related species.”185 
Remarkably, even though the reviews of Bt cotton by the two 
agencies occurred within months of each other, “[t]he agencies 
indicated that they did not communicate with one another on this 
issue before making their regulatory determinations.”186 According to 
the NRC, the complete failure of the agencies to communicate when 
making essentially the same regulatory decision, combined with their 
sharply differing regulatory conclusions, “may have resulted in 
stakeholder confusion and raised questions about the credibility of 
assessments.”187 
In short, based on the NRC Report’s review of this part of the 
agricultural biotechnology regulatory system, it would be difficult to 
describe U.S. regulation of pest-protected plants as comprehensive, 
consistent, or thorough. This description does not mean that there are 
inherent dangers to the creation or use of genetically created pest-
 
 180. Id. 
 181. See id. 
 182. See id. 
 183. See id. at 165-66. 
 184. See id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
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protected plants. What it does mean, however, is that the federal 
government needs to decide whether it is willing to make necessary 
improvements to its regulatory process or, alternatively, whether the 
tort liability system will be permitted to establish limitations on the 
use of such technology.188 
VII. ANALYSIS OF EXISTING AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 
REGULATION IN LIGHT OF SUSTAINABILITY PRINCIPLES 
The existing regulation of agricultural biotechnology has 
significant flaws, as described above. The question presented here is, 
essentially, whether the regulation of biotechnology demands 
distinctively better regulation than what presently exists for 
conventional agricultural products. This issue can be addressed by 
analyzing how well the regulatory system meets the sustainability 
criteria discussed above and considers marginal costs and benefits.  
A. Sustainable Yield and Biodiversity Maintenance 
The need for sustainable yield management and biodiversity 
maintenance exists in both conventional agriculture and agricultural 
biotechnology. In both cases, there is a clear tension between the 
range of possible improvements in crop varieties, and weed and pest 
control, and adaptations that can rapidly defeat such improvements 
and even, in the worst case, cause major crop losses or severe 
resource losses such as soil erosion or soil damage. This tension 
requires the federal government to take seriously the need to diversify 
and protect available agricultural resources, especially soil quality, 
water quality, and crop diversity. During the twentieth century, the 
federal government appropriately sought to conserve soil resources, 
 
 188. An example of the operation of the tort liability system would be informal 
compensation and/or litigation over the performance of Roundup Ready™ crop seed, which 
allegedly failed to perform properly when used. See Ronnie Cummins, Monsanto’s “Roundup 
Ready” Cotton Bombs in the USA, MOTION MAG. (Oct. 21, 1997), available at 
http://www.inmotionmagazine.com/cotton.html (describing potential class action lawsuit 
against Monsanto on behalf of cotton growers who suffered crop losses when Roundup Ready 
Cotton failed to grow properly). 
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protect food supply from contamination and monoculture, limit the 
use of pesticides, and prevent the spread of noxious weeds through 
various means including herbicides.189 The federal government, 
however, has not taken its responsibility to manage resources for 
sustainable yield and biodiversity maintenance as seriously as it 
should have with respect to both the resources it owns and the way in 
which the private sector produces its agricultural products. The 
federal government recognizes only in general terms that these 
considerations should be substantial factors in making agricultural 
resource decisions of various kinds.190 
One potentially significant difference between conventional and 
biotechnology agriculture is the speed and scale upon which change 
in crop composition, and hence habitat alteration, might occur. By 
markedly altering the economics of crop production, at least in the 
short run, biotechnology developments can potentially alter crop 
characteristics more widely and more quickly than can conventional 
agriculture. In addition, genetically modified plants and animals may, 
in some cases, not have natural predators in the ecosystems in which 
they are introduced, and may, as a result, have the same adverse 
impacts as a conventionally bred “exotic” species. Accordingly, 
although regulators may not generally need to treat sustainable yield 
and biodiversity maintenance issues fundamentally differently where 
conventional agriculture and agricultural biotechnology are 
concerned, there may be exceptions. In some cases, regulators may 
need to require more intensive premarket testing of some GMOs to 
provide additional scientific information on issues related to 
sustainable yield and biodiversity or to require physical limits on the 
extent of introduction of those new GMOs until they have a 
reasonable period of actual testing in commercial use. One such 
example is the limits the EPA imposed on the planting of Bt cotton. If 
an industry sponsor of a new GMO wishes to avoid such regulatory 
 
 189. For example, FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y, controls the presence of pesticides on the 
market, and the FFDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., protects the safety of the food supply. 
 190. Improving the federal government’s capacity to manage resources for sustainable 
yield and biodiversity would need to be the subject of a different article. In fact, in the newly 
significant context of bioterrorism, which could be conducted both through conventional and 
genetic engineering technologies, the federal government would be well advised to reexamine 
its capabilities in these areas. 
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restrictions, perhaps the sponsor should be prepared to provide some 
form of reasonable financial compensation in the event that 
unanticipated damage occurs to the crops of other growers, or to 
other field organisms or conventionally bred competitors, or if an 
increased need for chemical control results from the expanded use of 
the GMO.191  
B. Internalization of Costs 
As shown by the Starlink™ and other regulatory failure episodes 
described above, agricultural biotechnology is not yet being required 
to fully internalize its social costs.192 All of the case studies 
considered above share the characteristics that unintended “escape” 
of GMO material from a containment system created through 
regulation occurred, or is likely to occur, with varying degrees of 
harm resulting from the escape. This type of unintended escape is a 
social cost that regulators must fully account for and control. This 
regulatory failure to require full cost internalization constitutes an 
important failure by U.S. agricultural biotechnology policy to meet 
sustainability criteria. It is a failure that must be rectified either by 
improvements in the regulatory process or by adjustments made 
through the tort liability system. This issue will be discussed further 
in the next section. 
 
 191. For example, a GMO sponsor might purchase insurance coverage that would be able 
to be called on in the event that unanticipated damage of specified types occurred during the 
trial period. Such insurance might well be expensive, but there is no reason for the public to 
bear these unanticipated costs that result from premature introduction of a GMO. 
 192. There are assertions that biotechnology regulation involves excessive costs, or, at 
least, that costs should not be made higher. For example, industry sources claim that over $3 
billion were spent in permitting Bt plant products. See Abramson & Carrato, supra note 49, at 
257. However, the proper standard for the appropriate cost of regulation is that it should cost no 
more than is needed to impose regulations that will force the full internalization of social cost, 
not that the cost of regulation should meet some arbitrary, predetermined standard. If regulation 
is excessive, industry should challenge it by demonstrating that various aspects of the regulation 
are unnecessary. Particularly in the area of biotechnology, the government has seemed to be 
willing to consider such assertions seriously and to modify regulatory requirements where such 
demonstrations could be persuasively made.  
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C. Public Participation and Transparency 
On both public participation and transparency dimensions, the 
process of agricultural biotechnology regulation has historically 
fallen below the standards set by the United States in other areas of 
environmental law. In virtually all other areas of environmental law, 
the United States is a world leader in public participation and 
transparency, often as a result of congressional authorization through 
statutory citizen action provisions, with fundamentally positive 
results.193  
The major federal regulatory agencies appear to have belatedly 
recognized that they can improve both the transparency of 
decisionmaking and public participation in the regulation of 
agricultural biotechnology. Thus, for example, the FDA proposed to 
require premarket notification for biotechnology products that would 
be used as food.194 Various regulatory agencies agreed to do a better 
job of policing the use of overbroad confidential business information 
claims that may prevent public scrutiny of the health and safety 
impacts of new biotechnology developments.195 Although it is 
essential to safeguard industry rights to intellectual property in the 
regulatory process, it seems clear that better mechanisms can be 
developed to permit at least indirect public review of health and 
 
 193. The right of citizens to participate in and to challenge government regulatory action in 
court is one of the most distinctive features of American environmental law. In many cases it is 
responsible for preventing “regulatory capture,” a phenomenon that limits the effectiveness of 
government regulation so often in other areas of American regulation, and is even more 
prominent in most other countries. 
 194. The FDA recently proposed to move from voluntary to mandatory premarket 
notification of biotechnology foods.  
The proposed rule would require companies to provide notice of the intent to market a 
biotechnology food in the U.S. at least 120 days prior to commercial distribution 
through the submission of a Pre-market Biotechnology Notice (“PBN”). The PBN 
would include data and information about the food and a narrative discussing the data 
and information. The applicant must also agree to provide additional relevant data and 
information upon the Agency’s request. The public would have ready access to the 
PBN and the Agency’s response to it.  
See Abramson & Carrato, supra note 49, at 252-53. 
 195. For example, the USDA has provided clarification on the type of submitted 
information that may be designated as confidential business information. See NRC Report, 
supra note 1, at 174. 
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safety issues in the regulatory process.196 
All in all, the historical experience of other U.S. industries that 
employed controversial technologies, or were engaged in 
controversial business practices that had apparent potential for 
significant environmental and health effects, demonstrates that public 
support is an essential part of developing a successful new industry. 
Increased transparency and public participation in the regulatory 
process is an essential part of obtaining this public support and can 
actually avoid calls for more onerous public regulation either before 
or after development of new technology. Accordingly, Congress 
should consider imposing on the federal regulatory agencies 
requirements that they collect certain types of scientific data either 
before or after permitting various agricultural biotechnology 
products, such as the various studies recommended by the NRC 
Report, and that they make such data available for public review. 
VIII. ALTERNATIVE FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR SOCIAL CONTROL OF 
AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 
The EU seems to have embarked on a path toward more 
aggressive regulation of agricultural biotechnology. The EU proposed 
regulations that would require traceability of GMO food and feed 
products, regulations that would require additional labeling of such 
products, and regulations or international agreements that would 
permit countries to operate on the basis of the “precautionary 
principle” with respect to many GMOs, should they choose.197 The 
U.S. agricultural biotechnology industry is opposed to all of these 
regulatory changes.198  
It is certainly possible to view the proposed European changes as, 
 
 196. For example, federal agencies might develop considerably more extensive networks of 
outside “peer reviewers” for such issues than presently exist. In principle, there is no reason that 
members of the public with the necessary technical backgrounds could not execute appropriate 
confidentiality undertakings that would permit them to engage in necessary technical reviews 
while safeguarding a project sponsor’s intellectual property. 
 197. See Commission on the European Communities, supra note 109. 
 198. For example, thirty-eight organizations in the agri-food industry, including the trade 
association Biotechnology Industry Organization, urged President Clinton not to change the 
current FDA policy regarding labeling of biotech foods. See Letter to President Clinton (Nov. 
12, 1999), available at http://www.bio.org/food&ag/1112letter.html. 
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in many respects, little more than efforts to maintain trade barriers in 
favor of conventional European food producers. However, the 
European regulatory changes discussed above all involve efforts to 
subject GMO food and feed products to consumer and public choice 
and pressure. The changes also permit vetoes on the introduction of 
certain GMO products by European countries in the event of 
scientific uncertainty.199 Taken together, they adopt a model for 
regulation similar, in some respects, to U.S. environmental law, if it 
were adapted to GMO food and feed products.  
The American agricultural biotechnology industry prefers the U.S. 
food and drug regulation model instead of European-style 
regulation.200 In order to make this position ultimately defensible to 
the public, industry must persuade policymakers and the public both 
that agricultural biotechnology has very limited risks and that federal 
agency regulators can be counted on to require and enforce regulation 
that will control any remaining risks. As has been shown, there is 
definite support for at least the first of these contentions, but the 
second contention ultimately has its limits in light of the history of 
agricultural biotechnology regulatory failure and the limits of existing 
scientific knowledge. Improvements in federal agency regulation are 
therefore clearly necessary if long term public acceptance of GMO 
plant, food, and feed products is to occur. At the same time, if the 
agricultural biotechnology industry wants to make certain that it does 
not eventually face public demands for European style regulation and 
a shift in the basic burden of proof for permitting new products akin 
to the “precautionary principle,” it is probably going to have to accept 
a reasonable degree of tort liability to provide both compensation for 
harm and deterrence against unduly risky conduct.  
 
 199. See Francer, supra note 6, at 309-10. 
 200. Under the “food and drug” regulation model, individual states cannot set more 
stringent health and safety requirements for introduction of food and drugs into commerce than 
those set by the federal government because such state regulation is preempted by federal law. 
While this limitation means that industry is able to avoid local protectionism, it also means that 
members of the public are required to accept the idea that the federal government is better able 
to protect their health and safety than state authorities, which is not uniformly true. A “level 
playing field” argument is often made against European-style regulations, asserting that such 
regulations discriminate against biotechnology. This argument is quite correct, but is unlikely to 
change matters in terms of obtaining public support for biotechnology. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol9/iss1/7
p245 Van Cleve book pages.doc  12/18/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002]  Regulating Environmentalists 303 
 
IX. CLARIFYING THE TORT LIABILITY REGIME FOR AGRICULTURAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS 
 At present, it is uncertain what type of liability regime will be 
applied to harm caused by agricultural biotechnology products.201 
Because agricultural biotechnology products are potentially socially 
useful products, and agricultural biotechnology is not inherently 
dangerous, the higher the quality of federal regulatory review of 
agricultural biotechnology, the lower the level of tort liability for 
remaining harm the industry should be required to assume. Assuming 
that the regulatory system is indeed improved in the directions 
discussed above, there is a reasonable policy argument that 
agricultural biotechnology product tort liability should be limited in 
certain key respects sketched out below. It might be preferable for the 
industry to seek legislative clarification concerning the appropriate 
liability regime rather than waiting for the issue to be resolved in the 
courts.202 Development of a consensus on appropriate liability rules 
through the legislative process or some other means should 
strengthen public confidence in agricultural biotechnology.  
Broadly speaking, harm caused by agricultural biotechnology 
could theoretically be divided into four categories: harm caused by 
permit violations; harm caused to protected natural resources; harm 
caused to conventional crops and conventionally bred animals; and 
human health harms. 
 
 201. Several articles surveyed the tort liability regime that may be applied to 
biotechnology products. For the reader’s information, and without meaning to endorse any of 
their conclusions, see, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Barbara A. Boczar, Biotechnology and Tort 
Liability: A Strategic Industry at Risk, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 791 (1994); Charles A. Deacon & 
Emilie K. Paterson, Emerging Trends in Biotechnology Litigation, 20 REV. LITIG. 589 (2001); 
Julie A. Davies & Lawrence C. Levine, Biotechnology’s Challenge to the Law of Torts, 32 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 221 (2000).  
 202. The reasons for this preference have to do with the inconsistency of results that may 
occur in litigation given the uncertainty regarding appropriate liability standards, and its very 
substantial costs. Moreover, a fair amount of litigation regarding damage allegedly done by 
agricultural biotechnology may occur in the context of class action lawsuits, which are often 
exceptionally time consuming and expensive. Finally, clear legislative standards governing 
industry liability may be necessary to make industry operations insurable by private insurers. 
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A. Harm Caused as a Result of Permit Violations  
An improved regulatory system will be the foundation of social 
protection against the risks of agricultural biotechnology until there is 
sufficient scientific data to accurately and fully assess the risks of 
biotechnology products in advance. Accordingly, agricultural 
biotechnology products as to which there are significant scientific 
uncertainties should be subject to strict liability for harms caused, if 
such harms are caused by violations of regulatory permit conditions. 
Exemptions from this requirement can be made on a case-by-case 
basis as experience grows.  
A rule of strict liability for such harms will ensure the 
enforceability of such regulatory permit conditions and limit the need 
for the government to add additional regulatory requirements or 
increase enforcement resources. In some cases where there are 
particularly large uncertainties about a particular biotechnology 
product and potential for large harms related to those uncertainties, 
regulatory authorities may need to consider a requirement for 
financial assurance to be provided by the project sponsor to ensure 
that if harm occurs as a result of a permit violation, a permit applicant 
will have the financial resources to pay the resulting costs. In any 
event, fine and penalty provisions of federal law relating to 
agricultural biotechnology permit violations should be strictly 
enforced; Congress should appropriate sufficient funds so that 
regulatory agencies and law enforcement entities have the necessary 
resources to ensure such enforcement occurs.  
B. Harm Caused to Protected Natural Resources  
There is substantial evidence that agricultural biotechnology 
products, such as transgenic salmon, can adversely affect natural 
resources, such as wild salmon populations, if not properly regulated. 
Agricultural biotechnology products should be subject to strict 
liability for harm caused at least to those natural resources that 
receive special statutory protection, such as the Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act or the Endangered Species Act, in the same manner and 
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on the same basis as would be true for harm to such resources caused 
by products of conventional agriculture or its operations. 
Consideration may also need to be given to requiring financial 
assurance for both conventional agriculture and agricultural 
biotechnology products with respect to certain types of federally 
permitted environmental releases that may cause irreversible 
environmental damage, such as extinction of a species.  
C. Harm Caused to Conventional Crops and Conventionally Bred 
Animals 
Absent a regulatory permit violation, agricultural biotechnology 
products should generally be subject to liability for harm caused to 
crops and conventionally bred animals only on the basis of fault, such 
as negligence.203 However, the government should develop a low cost 
means, such as internet publication, of providing information 
regarding the use of agricultural biotechnology products and 
avoidance of unintended consequences of such use to producers of 
conventional crops and conventionally bred animals and to 
agricultural biotechnology product users.  
D. Human Health Harms 
The protection of human health is a fundamental requirement for a 
successful agricultural biotechnology regulatory system. Because 
conventional agriculture and agricultural biotechnology may pose 
comparable risks to health, assuming an improved regulatory system 
(including provision for additional testing for potential human health 
harms such as allergenicity and toxicity) and absent a permit 
violation that caused the harm, agricultural biotechnology products 
should be subject to liability for harm caused to human health only 
under the same liability scheme and in those circumstances where a 
conventional food producer would be subject to such liability. 
Punitive damages should only be available for intentional or grossly 
 
 203. Consideration should be given, however, to whether in certain exceptional types of 
cases traditional common law principles such as nuisance or trespass might continue to apply 
even where only permitted releases occurred. 
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negligent violations of regulatory requirements that cause significant 
harm or in circumstances where such damages would be available 
against a conventional agricultural food or feed producer. 
X. CONCLUSION 
Although agricultural biotechnology has the potential to provide 
useful products, it also poses some new environmental and safety 
risks in addition to some of the same risks posed by conventional 
agriculture. The U.S. federal regulatory system clearly needs 
improvement as a result of regulatory failures in the federal 
government’s control of agricultural biotechnology. If needed 
regulatory improvements are made, tort liability for agricultural 
biotechnology products should, in certain key respects, parallel the 
rules governing tort liability for conventional agriculture, but may, in 
specific cases, require more stringent liability standards. Taken 
together, these reforms should be sufficient to permit the rational 
development of agricultural biotechnology while ensuring 
agricultural sustainability.  
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